

¿Qué es el Kirchnerismo?: Interpreting Political Economy of Kirchnerismo (2003-2013) Based on Elements of Contemporary Populism

Comps 400
March 14, 2014
Professor Alfred Montero
Janghun Yun

Abstract: In this paper, I argue that the elements of populism are the most fundamental to understand Kirchnerismo (2003-2013). Understanding populism as a socio-political phenomenon that responds to the demands of people (el pueblo), the main political strategies of Kirchner's administration has been the inclusion of social actors such as *los piqueteros* and labor unions that lost their political authority during 1990's. Its political tactic of including social actors was possible because of commodity boom and clientelism. I will focus on the reason why Kirchnerismo sought political support from social actors such as labor unions and social movements groups, and how an economic boom and clientelism sustained Kirchner's center left model for the last ten years.

Key words: Populism, Kirchnerismo, Social Movement, Labor Union, Commodity Boom, Clientelism

In October 2003, Nestor Kirchner, as a candidate of the populist (peronists) party Partido Justicialista (PJ), was elected as the president of Argentina. It was a surprising result for many people since Kirchner was not a major political figure but a governor of Santa Cruz province, where political influence is not as significant as candidates in the Buenos Aires province. The electoral result demonstrated that he barely won the election by 22.3 percent of total votes, reflecting that his political authority was not firmly established. In addition to his political weakness, Argentina's economic situation was not favorable to Kirchner's new administration. The collapse of the financial system in 2001 largely caused by the mismanagement of Carlos Menem's previous neoliberal regime led to one of the worst crises in Argentine history. Deeply disappointed and resented by the failures of successive Argentine governments, many Argentines criticized the neoliberal-based political economy and claimed "*¡Que se vayan todos!*" ("All of them must leave").

Kirchner's regime, facing social unrest and economic crisis, employed new tactics to restore political stability. The main strategies of *kirchnerismo* were to separate itself from the previous regime that caused the financial crisis in 2001, and incorporate with social movements groups such as *fabricas recuperadas* (recuperated factories) and *los piqueteros* (informal labors). It also supported the restoration of labor unions that lost its influence during the neoliberal era. Based on this fact, the main puzzle for this paper emerges: what is the significance of its strategies that contributed to establish his populist hegemony called *kirchnerismo*? What were the political conditions that led *kirchnerismo* to ally with social movement groups and labor unions? These questions are essential to understand the main reason why *kirchnerismo* evolved during a specific period in Argentina and highlight its tactics that are different from other governments in Latin America.

In this paper, I focus on clarifying *kirchnerismo* as an evolution of populism and its tactics to construct a new political hegemony. First of all, I analyze that it is important to perceive *kirchnerismo* as a populist phenomenon that tries to represent a new paradigm as post-neoliberalism. After the collapse of neoliberal policies that dominated Argentina during 1990's, there was a vacuum in the political arena, unclear about what would replace neoliberalism as a new political ideology. In this sense, *kirchnerismo* filled up the political vacuum by integrating different social actors into his regime. Among many social groups that had been formed during 1990's, I focus on why *kirchnerismo* incorporated labor unions and social movement groups, especially *los piqueteros* who represented the unemployed and informal sector workers. As a populist model, *kirchnerismo* recognized that these were the main groups that had been marginalized during the neoliberal period. Its strategies were to reintegrate them into the political arena as his core political allies. The representation of social actors and especially those in the labor sector of Argentine society was the emblem of *kirchnerismo*.

Before discussing what elements characterize *kirchnerismo* as populism, I will analyze the term populism used in Latin American politics. Among many scholars, populism has been a complex term that includes numerous ways of interpretation. Many scholars such as Laclau (2005), Conniff (2005), and Panizza (2007) point out that, because of its nature as political phenomenon rather than ideology, populism tends to be transgressive and flexible, evolving in ways that form depend on the circumstance of society. However, Kirchner's populism regime requires a better interpretation that is distinct from past populist regimes. The connotation of populism, based on the classic populism of the 1950s (or even in 1970's), tended to be interpreted as negative (the rise of Juan Perón or Getúlio Vargas as caudillo figures, nationalization of industries, the economic collapse due to imprudent state intervention, etc.).

Ernesto Laclau (2005) supports this point arguing that the negative connotation of populism fails to take into account that the term populism deserves a more nuanced interpretation. Instead of understanding populism based on what it was in the past, there should be a redefinition of populist phenomenon from a different perspective (Bilgllieri and Perello 2007). The focus should be on how populism has evolved by adjusting to critical juncture and how it constructs symbols in politics. Unlike the political ideology of the left-right spectrum that is typical of politics in Latin America, populism has fluidity. It transforms itself in various ways to represent people (*el pueblo*). Given that political institutions are unstable and the quality of democracy is questionable in Argentina, populism should be interpreted as an alternative form of politics, depending on a charismatic leadership and seeking a new political identity.

The *Kirchnerismo* used populist discourse in the 2003-2013 period to formulate an alternative form of politics. First, using populist discourse, it formed an anti status quo perspective that separated *el pueblo* from imperialism. By establishing an antagonistic perspective on the neoliberal agenda, Kirchner was successful in separating his government from the previous regime. He established a new political identity by integrating previously excluded and social actors by creating a pluralistic and horizontal relationship between the government and these social groups. Kirchner understood what *el pueblo* mainly demanded after the neoliberal period and that required the state's intervention for recognizing their political identity. Kirchner's main political agenda focused on incorporating the majority who felt excluded from the society and recognized *el pueblo's* interest and identity.

The next step is to analyze the main factors that helped Kirchner sustain his political hegemony. I argue that the commodity boom that favored the export-led growth was fundamental importance to expanding Kirchner's populism model. It led to the gradual

economic recovery from the financial crisis after 2001 and provided resources for populist distribution. In contrast to Argentina's classic populist leader, Juan Perón, Kirchner's regime was the beneficiary of an export boom in non-wage goods (soy bean) and his government was more prudent in managing monetary policies, including well-timed devaluations, a sustained fiscal surplus, and balance of payment surpluses (Richardson 2008). Another sustaining factor that should be understood is the extension of clientelism during the Kirchner's era. The peronist political machine that dominates the Argentine political system was been maintained during the Kirchner period and it has been the main vehicle for governing the votes of the poor (Shapiro 2010, Ayuero 2001, Szwarcberg 2010). So, I argue that a contribution of a favorable economic "commodity boom" and the contribution of clientelistic mechanisms in the political system were two central factors sustaining Kirchner's administration.

Lastly, I articulate that populism is a short-term phenomenon that fails to last for a long time. Unless the populist leader strengthens elements of democracy - political party, rule of law, and regular elections – the populist regime always has a high chance to suffer another crisis (Edward 2010, Corrales 2006, Dornbusch 2007). The populist cycle will continue to repeat, if there are no fundamental commitments to change the political system. As the current crisis of devaluation in last January or the defeat of Kirchner's populist party FPV (Frente Para Victoria) in the legislative election in October 2013 indicates, Kirchner seems to fit into the framework of populism. However, I will not make the weakness of political institutions and the populist cycle a central argument but rather consider them as given factors that have persisted for a long time in the political history of Argentina. My central argument will focus on highlighting what social phenomena caused the emergence of *kirchnerismo*, its contribution to reintegrate socially marginalized groups, and how it was successful in establishing its hegemony for the past ten

years. I will also articulate that both Nestor and Cristina Kirchner's political discourse fit into the framework of populism called *kirchnerismo* but the latter one has been facing more conflicts. The commodity boom eventually declined since 2008 and the abuse of the presidential power such as manipulation of inflation rates questioned the quality of democracy, which weakened the political authority of Cristina's administration (2008-current).

The *Kirchnerismo* and the "New Left" trend in Latin America

Both Kirchners' administration is often grouped with other New Left governments in Latin American countries. Many scholars assert that many leftist governments emerged in Latin America after Hugo Chávez's first election in 1998 in response to the failure of neoliberalism policies during 1980's and 1990's. They consider the rise of *kirchnerismo* as part of the same new left trend. It is interesting to note that the term "new" is added before left in order to clarify that the contemporary new left leaders have modified radical elements of leftists such as Che Guevara or Fidel Castro in the 1960's. New left leaders in Latin America share similarities with antecedent left leaders in that they both focus on wealth distribution, justice, and social equality. However, the use of resources by new left leaders has been more moderate and democratic, because the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990 and uninterrupted democratic period since the mid 1980's limited the reemergence of radical form of leftist government (Roberts and Levitsky 2003).

Given that the "New Left" trend has been widespread in the region, some scholars such as Madrid (2010), Castañeda (2006), and Schamis (2010) make their own argument to categorize 'New Left' countries. They analyze the degree of the left trend in terms of effectiveness of political institution, political parties, and degree of state intervention in each Latin American country. In terms of categorizing Kirchner's degree of radicalism, Castañeda

(2006) groups Argentina together with Venezuela and Bolivia, in the category of “bad” and “irresponsible” populism. Svampa and Murillo (2010), however, argue that Argentina should not be in the same group with Chávez’s Venezuela since Kirchner’s ability to concentrate power was limited by robust democratic institutions, a strong civil society and the nature of his own peronist (populist) coalition. Moreover, as Levitsky and Roberts (2013) indicate, the turn to the new left in Latin America has been questioned. The slight shift to the left has indeed occurred, and the trend is region-wide, but the magnitude of the shift is small and the center of gravity remains somewhat to the right. Seligson (2007) even articulates that ideological dispositions along the classic left-right continuum do indeed have a meaningful impact on partisan orientations for many Latin Americans but national contexts matter a great deal. This is an important argument that highlights the unique historical experience of each country and its social condition after the experiences with neoliberalism policies. There should be a different framework to understand Argentina’s unique political condition and the emergence of *kirchnerismo*.

Kirchnerismo and the Concept of Populism

Populism as a political phenomenon in Latin America has been a complicated term among political scientists. Many scholars argue that populism is a term that has various interpretations, and no one single definition to explain the phenomenon. The political effects of populism are highly varied and their results are often unpredictable since the concept of populism is not a political ideology but rather a political phenomenon (Laclau 2005; Pereyra 2012). Nonetheless, there are three general points that scholars address in order to clarify populism in Latin America. First, as Cammack (2000), Di Tella (2011), and Torre (2013) point the defining dimension of populism as the disjuncture between the people (*el pueblo*) against the

structure of established power and as a challenge to the values of elites. They focus on the fact that populism is a social phenomenon that organizes a certain class in order to resist dominant elite groups. Cammack (2010) describes it as:

“A political movement characterized by mass support from the urban working class and/or peasantry, a strong element of mobilization from above, a central role of leadership from the middle sector or elite, typically of a personalistic and/or charismatic character; and an anti status quo, nationalist ideology and program” (Cammack 2010)

Germani (1978) argues that we should understand populism as “structural functionalist” that stimulates the phase of social development, as the populist movement during 1930’s provoked a transition from the traditional society to the industrial society. It is a political movement that has significant popular support that sustains an ideology that is an anti status quo (Di Tella 1965).

Another feature of populism explained by scholars is that it is a permanent phenomenon where representative institutions are weak, fragile, or ineffective at articulating and responding to social concerns (Gutierrez 2011; Laclau 2005; Roberts 2011). Populism emerges after a critical juncture, a period of decisive political change and uncertainty, when established institutional arrangements are challenged and a range of different outcomes become viable possibilities (Roberts 2011). In this way, populism could be interpreted as a sudden phenomenon, rather than following the gradual reforms. It seeks for a moment of opportunity, as Rinesi (2010) argues, to establish a new politics after a decisive political change. In a similar way, Laclau (2005) supports this aspect by arguing that populism is all about constructing a new political hegemony after the collapse of old politics.

Those scholars who study the reemergence of populism in Latin America interpret populism in a slightly different way. Roberts (2006), Biglieri (2007), Laclau (2005), and Pereyra (2012) emphasize more on the fact that the political discourse of contemporary populism

includes a concept of *el pueblo* vs. the rest (oligarchy, elites, etc.). According to Laclau, the concept of pueblo is the name of community (Argentine community, Venezuelan community, Mexican community, etc.), but tends to represent the specific part of the community, which is less privileged (Laclau 2005). He explains that *el pueblo* referred to by populism is a “*plebs*” (the *pleb* represents the less privileged) that reclaims to be the unique and legitimate populus (*pueblo*, or community). Therefore, populism is a representation of the people within the community, who should be the true representation of the community. Populist leaders recognize their demands and politicize them by creating a relation of antagonism in the form of a political frontier between the people and what they identify as enemies.

In addition, populism contains the charismatic populist leader who embodies the people (*el pueblo*). According to Panizza (2009), populist leaders construct popular identities by claiming to speak for the people and in doing so they combine the politics of recognition to the politically excluded with the politics of distribution to those disadvantaged by the economic system. Populist leaders are responsible for establishing a regime that meets the demands from *el pueblo*, which typically involves greater equality, justice, and benefits for all the community. Populism is not so much the direct relationship between the leader and the people but the leader’s ability to reach those who regard themselves having no voice in the populist system (Cammack 2000). Therefore, the core of populism is a claim to speak for the people. In case of populism in Latin America, scholars point out that because of high social inequality after the failure of populism, speaking for the people combines both the politics of recognition and politics of redistribution (Feliz 2012). When the middle class and lower classes lack autonomous forms of social and political expression, personalistic leaders can appeal directly to an amorphous pueblo and claim to embody its interests.

Lastly, Laclau (2005) argues that populism is the path to reconstructing the political by creating an ambiguous vision of the *demos* (the people). He considers it ambiguous because the constituted unity of the group as people does not say much about the ideological content of this construct. His argument is:

“The notion of populism is not related to specific ideological positions but instead expresses a social rationale of political identity formation. Ideological and conceptual vagueness are intrinsic to this form of identity building. Populism requires ideological simplicity and emptiness, drawing an antagonistic division around some empty signifiers. [...] The specific ideological contents that are mobilized to construct the empty signifier of the people in each particular conjuncture are irrelevant to a formal theory of populism [...] this is why between left wing and right wing populism, there is a nebulous no-man’s-land which can be crossed in many directions” (Laclau 2005).

Laclau’s argument is valid since the classic populism in the 1940’s and neo-populism in the 1990’s had a different political ideology, depending on the social condition that they were facing. As long as they are appealing to people, the political ideology is not a significant factor for populism. Because of this vagueness or ideological simplicity and emptiness, Laclau (2005) argues that populism also contains a notion of heterogeneity. Because of this heterogeneity, substantial sectors of the lower classes are available for political mobilization but are not effectively represented by established parties and do not possess institutionalized forms of political self-expression. It is to say that populism encounters limits of heterogeneity to meet social demands, because the unity of *el pueblo* (people) is contingent, not representing the absolute political identity.

Whether populism is good or bad, those who study contemporary populism agrees that it thrives in contexts of social atomization. Scholars tend to interpret populism based on sociological and historical perspective rather than other factors. This allowed us to highlight that populism encourages individuals to recognize and exercise citizenship rights and they help develop social capital that is conducive to both economic development and political democracy

(Novaro 2006; Pagni 2012). What they articulate more is the problem of marginalization of people rather than the poverty of lower classes as previous populist leaders did. Contemporary forms of populism do not emphasize redistributive economic policies. Rather it must be recognized that populism continues to feed off the social, economic, and most importantly the exclusion of the lower classes.

Many scholars emphasize that the destructive consequences of neoliberalism during Menem's administration were largely felt by the labor sector. The workers were the ones who lost not only their occupation but also their political authority within the Argentine society. Levitsky (2007) and McGuire (1997) highlight that labor unions were the most important political supporters of *peronismo* until Menem's era. However, as McGuire (1997) illustrated, labor unions' efforts to institutionalize the party-union linkage were repeatedly derailed over the course of the labor movement's history. It is to say, although strongly supported by the *peronismo* movement, labor unions did not appear in party statutes rarely registered with local party authorities, and maintained near-total autonomy from party bureaucracy (McGuire 1997). Levitsky's argument corresponds to the argument that the Justicialista Party (PJ) was a mass-based party, but its mass organization was fluid and informal, rather than bureaucratic and its internal rules and procedures were contested, widely manipulated, and often ignored (Levitsky 2003).

The incomplete integration of labor unions into the Peronist party (PJ) had disastrous results. Roberts (2007) argues that in Argentina, Menem undoubtedly hurt the Peronist party and exacerbated its institutional informality by conflating his personal political interests with those of the party. Unlike classic populism that highlights the importance of the labor sector, Menem's administration was a right wing neo-populism pursuing completely different economic policies.

The *Menemismo* did not consider organized labor as an effective vehicle for reaching out to lower and working class constituencies (Robert 2006). As a consequence labor unions became fragmented and moved against Menem's neoliberal policy. This transition had an important meaning in changing social structure of Argentina. The literatures on fragmentation of labor unions during the 1990's are closely related to the rise of Kirchner's populism movement. Kirchner's administration recognized fragmented labor unions as 'the people' and what were their social demands, after the collapse of Menem's administration. Kirchner's cooptation with labor unions was an essential political tactic to establish his populism model.

In order to understand Kirchner's policies toward social movement groups (specifically *los piqueteros*) Murillo (2001), Etchemendy and Collier (2007) articulate why *kirchnerismo* were interested in allying with the labor sector. First, they point out that the fact that Kirchners were elected with little support made the government seek out with various political coalitions. The political agenda of Nestor Kirchner was appealing to workers since they were the most marginalized groups during the neoliberal era. Murillo (2001) explains that how CGT (*Confederación General del Trabajo*), CTA (*Central de Trabajadores de la Argentina*), and *los Piqueteros* benefited from Kirchner's pro-labor union policies. Etchemendy and Collier (2007) use a term called "segmented neocorporatism" in order to explain the pattern of peak-level bargaining in which autonomous national unions, business, and government negotiate a minimum wage and a wage increase parameter in exchange for real wage gains and "corporatist inducements." Although it is not as strong as the close relationship between *peronismo* and labor unions during 1940's, *kirchnerismo* clearly restored the influence of labor unions in Argentine society. It was to the mutual benefit for both Kirchner's administration and labor sector.

Legacies of Traditional Populism

I found that much scholarship focus on the general success of *kirchnerismo*, despite the fact that it emerged with almost no political coalition and during an economic crisis. What scholars argue is that *kirchnerismo* as a populist phenomenon that benefited from the favorable economic situation after 2003. The other sustaining factor for Kirchner's success was his use of clientelism as a method to gain political support. Specifically, the economic boom caused by China's high demand for soybeans was a decisive factor that provided a generous condition for organizing Kirchner's political coalition (Richardson 2008). Yet, as scholars note, this was a temporary phase of populism. In the long run, heavily depending on legacies of traditional populism such as clientelism and an economy of natural resources does not establish a stable political base. The existence of effective political institutions in Argentina has been a continuous question for a long time of modern political history of Argentina.

Economic performance has always been a decisive factor that populist leaders had to control. If Argentina's economic performance declined, voters would begin attaching more weight to problems – among them corruption, poor governance, and public-sector inefficiency – that threatened the president's popularity (Calvo and Murillo 2010). The commodity boom that started after 2003 was the fundamental promoter that allowed *kirchnerismo* to employ center left populist strategies. Mazucca (2010) uses the term “rentier populism” that explains populist leaders' dependency on natural resource exportation to govern their country. Although Argentina is not as dependent on rentier populism as Ecuador, Bolivia, and Venezuela, the increase in soybean rents indicates that Kirchner's administration is a part of rentierism in Latin America. Richardson (2008) argues that the shift on the *pampas* from wage goods (beef and wheat) production to non-wage goods (soybean) cultivation allowed the establishment of export-

oriented populism. Unlike the previous populist regime in 1970s that had a problem of exporting wage goods due to inflation within the domestic market, non-wage goods such as soybeans benefited the current administration. Since soybean was not the major product consumed in Argentina, the dramatic inflation was not a huge impact for the initial period of *kirchnersimo*. Instead, by imposing taxes and devaluating the currency Kirchner was able to use gain revenues for subsidization. He argues:

“In January 2007, Kirchner increased export taxes on soy products to 24 percent on oil and meal and 27.5 percent on the export of the unprocessed oil seed. This additional soy-specific tax of 4 percent was forecast to generate an additional US \$400 million in fiscal revenue in 2007” (Richardson 2008).

In sum, soybean exportation was an element of ‘fortuna’ for Kirchner’s administration. It not only provided tax revenues to subsidize efforts to reduce poverty, but it also increased minimum wage that strengthened its alliance with labor unions. The commodity boom allowed Kirchner to accumulate capitals and the use of benefits to construct his political authority.

The political factor that most helped Kirchner’s regime consolidate with many social actors and establish a political doctrine of *kirchnerismo* is clientelism. Even if Argentina is a country that maintains a democratic system, high social inequality and poverty rates that worsened during the era of neoliberal policies. As O’Donnell (1994) indicates, the persistence of clientelism seems to be at odds with what we would expect from consolidated democracies. For many urban or rural poor, clientelism has been a more appealing political mechanism, and contemporary populist leaders recognize the patronage system was effective in gaining political supports. Scholars such as Ayuero (2001) Shapiro (2010) and Stokes (2007) who study clientelism indicate that it has been an important strategy for gaining votes. According to Ayuero (2001), political clientelism has been one of the most recurring and influential images when studying political strategies to the urban or rural poor sectors in Latin America. His extensive

ethnographic and anthropological studies indicate how local brokers from the PJ permeate the daily life of the poor and aid them in exchange for votes. Strokes (1996) supports Ayuero's (2001) argument with quantitative research. Her research focuses on how effective clientelism among the urban and rural poor is compared to the middle class sector. The results from her research indicate that the degree of competition among politicians and poverty rates are the most fundamental factor that decides whether politicians tempt to use clientelism or not.

Repeating Classic Populism: Good or Bad?

The populist strategy that *kirchnerismo* used to organize its power are successful, but scholars argue that it is not stable. Edwards and Dornbusch (1991) highlight that populist regimes have always declined due to its economic problems, specifically high inflation. Many scholars who study elements of populism also point out the hyper-presidentialism that populism entails. According to Helmke (2007), institutional instability follows a similar path dependent logic in which an initial period of institutional failure rooted in historically contingent circumstances effectively locks a polity into what she calls an "institutional instability trap." Her argument is that if political actors do not expect institutions to endure they will not invest in those institutions. Instead, they may invest in strategies and technologies appropriate to a weak institutional environment and may thus develop a stake in non-institutional politics. (Helmke 2007) His theory explains that Argentina's persistence of populism follows the populist cycle trap. The emergence of political phenomena called *kirchnerismo* seems successful in integrating socially marginalized groups, representing the Argentine community (*el pueblo Argentino*), but its durability is quite questionable.

My methodology to support my argument is straightforward. Based on various theoretical arguments on populism as I mentioned on the Literature Review section, I will find out how

kirchnerismo fits into the framework of populism. I will specifically explain how *kirchnerismo* established the concept of pueblo vs. the rest (oligarchy, imperialism) by creating “the enemies” for the Argentine community (*el pueblo Argentino*). Among many political coalitions that *kirchnerismo* recognized, I highlight social movement groups (specifically *los piqueteros*) and labor unions as its fundamental political supporters. Then I will explain how Kirchner’s center left populism position evokes *peronismo* during 1940’s due to their similarities, but *kirchnerismo* involves more elements than *peronismo* because populism has been adapted to the evolution of Argentine society.

For the next step, I will specifically analyze how the commodity boom that started in 2003 functioned favorably during Kirchner’s administration. Some quantitative data will be used in order to demonstrate the general economic recovery, indicated by unemployment rates, GDP growth, and its use of profits for increase in minimum wages, I will also explain how clientelism persists in Argentine society, largely focusing on ethnographic accounts. Lastly, I will evaluate *kirchnerismo* as another regime that fits into populist cycle trap, despite the fact that it achieved to recognize the people in the Argentine society.

***Kirchnerismo* as Center Left Populism**

The caudillo figure, or charismatic leadership is a populist feature demonstrated during Kirchner’s administration. In the middle of economic crisis and mass social movements in the early 2000’s, the rise of *kirchnerismo* entailed a president with an image of savior and a leader who came from outside of established politics. Kirchner emphasized the fact that he was the governor of Santa Cruz and was not related to politicians who had responsibility for the economic collapse. Using the idea of politics of anti-politics, he was able to overcome the difficulty of a president who was elected only with 23 percent of the popular vote, the lowest

percentage ever obtained by an Argentine president (Edwards 2010). In order to organize his political coalition and doctrine, he gradually used a hyper-presidencialism strategy to build up his political authority (Torres 2013). Calvo and Murillo (2010) argue the number of Need and Urgency Decrees (DNU) issued by presidents measure the concentration of executive authority (allowing leaders to bypass the legislature). Their research demonstrates that while president Raúl Alfonsín issued 10 DNUs between 1983 and 1989, Néstor Kirchner issued 270 between 2003 and 2007 (Calvo and Murillo 2010).

The next task *kirchnerismo* focused was creating a concept of *el pueblo* versus the enemy. This dichotomy pitted “We Argentines” (“*nosotros, el pueblo argentino*”) against the enemy (“*ellos, los enemigos del pueblo argentino*”) (Biglieri and Perello 2000). Those groups that *kirchnerismo* targeted as enemies were the military dictators that were accused of grave violations of human rights, privatized corporations during 1990’s, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Biglieri and Perello). It was clear that he set up an idea of anti status quo (against neoliberalism) to create enemies, while the components of *el pueblo* identified in *kirchnerismo* were the rest of “the Argentine people.” Montero describes how Kirchner often highlights term pueblo as:

“So, not to be wrong, this is not just a triumph and a merit of the government, but is an achievement of all the Argentine people (pueblo argentino) and of the Argentine Republic, or in this renegotiation the Argentine people has in his government, the first defender of their (pueblo) interests.” (La Nacion 2006)

In the populist discourse of *kirchnerismo*, the term *el pueblo* contributed to consolidate the link between the representatives and the represented (Torre 2013). As the representative of the nation, Kirchner effectively recognized the demands of the Argentine people, which represented those groups that were hurt by neoliberal policies.

Once clarifying that *kirchnerismo* advocates the people, the next puzzle is who exactly composes Kirchner's definition of the Argentine People (el pueblo Argentino). *El pueblo* that represents *kirchnerismo* is a plurality of demands from diverse movements or social actors. This included organizations for the defense of human rights that claimed the need for punishment of the military officers responsible for the crimes of the dictatorship, social movement groups that led mass protest against unemployment and social exclusion, and leaders of the parties in crisis (Sidicaro 2011). The fact that he includes various social actors rather than political groups reinforced Kirchner's image of leading a progressive and heterogeneous political coalition. The term transversalidad is used to describe the rejection of previous politicians and incorporate social actors into the political arena. The symbol of Kirchner's politics is, therefore, progressive and protest-oriented in order to defend those social actors' demands as a representation of the Argentine people.

Evolution of Peronismo

Although its populist discourse is often vague and unclear, Kirchner's tendency to be on the left ideologically overlaps the Peronism of the 1940's. First, as I noted above, populism could adopt either left or right ideology, depending on the orientation of people's demands. Populism is always fluid, and the traditional Peronism "of the center" is also represented in *kirchnerismo*. Moreover, Kirchner was similar to classical Peronism in that it recovered the role of state in Argentine society. While *menemismo* during 1990's had minimized state's role and pursued neoliberal policies that were related to the idea of *laissez faire*, Kirchner recognized the important role of the state to maintain the society stable. Although it is not as radical as Peronism's developmentalism and state intervention-oriented policy, *kirchnerismo* returned to

the idea that the state had to manage issues such as social equality, protection for workers, and their distribution of wealth.

President Cristina Kirchner for in speech to celebrate Industry Day on September 11, 2013, and avowed that “the industry is Argentina’s future and it evokes the slogan of Juan Perón during his regime (Clarín 2013). She also confirmed her Peronist position when she responded to the question of “What is the Kirchnerism.” Her answer was “it is like trying to explain what is *peronismo*” (Clarín 2013). In Argentine politics, Juan Perón’s national populism during 1940s remains a myth that led to progress and economic development in Argentina. Peronism as a social movement became deeply rooted in Argentina and its influence is still strong. The perception is that Peronism governs well while alternative forms of politics not (Malamud 2013). The fact that *kirchnerismo* highlights the importance of reinforcing labor unions and the unemployed and their social movements evokes the classic Peronism that advocated the social rights of shirtless ones (*los descamisados*) during 1940’s.

However, it is more correct to claim that *kirchnerismo* is an evolution of Peronism that adds more elements of contemporary social conditions. First, the difference is that Kirchner’s political discourse has more autonomy from civil society. Given that there are diverse groups that had been incorporated as political coalitions, *kirchnerismo* is more pluralistic and horizontal. *Kirchnerismo* avoids a vertical way of managing political coalitions that Juan Perón used to foster relations between his regime and the labor unions. For instance, Kirchner’s administration coopted with social organization leaders instead of repressing social conflicts. His rhetoric put less emphasis on class struggle and tended to be more protest-oriented. This was evident in the fact that his political coalitions were composed mostly human rights organizations, *los piquetero* movements, and labor unions.

During the import substitution industrialization (ISI) process in the 1940's, Peronism clearly maximized state intervention in the market economy as a means of industrializing political economy of Argentina. Perón used available resources to promote growth in national wealth to raise the standard of living of the popular sectors (Gerchunoff 1996). Peronism needed support from urban labor sectors for the continuation of the ISI process. The labor unions recognized the state as the formal and material base of their legitimacy, which facilitated their efforts to take an important position in the process of industrialization. However, it is important to note that political parties were not designated to represent the interest of certain groups. Levitsky (2008) argues that the weak institutionalization of the Peronist party is a key variable for understanding both its intermittent internal struggles and its capacity to adapt to changing circumstances. Weak political institutions are related to unstable political parties. Levitsky (2008) shows this is the reason why Argentine peronismo, whose internal rules were unstable and weakly enforced, underwent rapid and far-reaching programmatic change during the 1990's. During Menem's administration, Peronism transformed itself from a labor-based party into a patronage-based machine capable of undertaking radical market-oriented reform (Levitsky 2008).

Carlos Menem's implementation of neoliberal policies caused structural change in Argentine society. This facilitated the elimination of numerous state dependencies and rules that protected workers (Marcelo 1997, Pucciarelli 2010, Castiglioni 1996, Azpiazu 2001 and Fair 2009). From the beginning of the 1990s, like other Latin American countries, Carlos Menem's Argentina implemented the "Washington Consensus" as a guide for macroeconomic policy (Azpiazu 2001). Unilateral trade and financial openness, privatization of public enterprises, and deregulation of domestic markets of goods and financial instruments became the key instruments of his economic program (Marcelo 1997).

Argentina experienced a decline in the quality of life of workers. While during the decade of the 1970s, the poverty rate was 5 percent at the end of the 1990s it spiked to 30 percent and reached the historical peak of 57 percent in 2002 (Abal 2013). In this way, a substantial part of the workforce turned into a new poor underclass that also included the unemployed from small businesses and the agricultural sectors. Labor market privatization generated a huge and increasing social sector called the excluded (*los excluidos*) deprived of the rights and obligations of citizenship *de facto*. (Abal 2013). As Portes (2003) argues, the decline of industrial sectors and the negative implications of this change on workers during the 1980s and the 1990s were prevalent in many Latin American countries (Portes 2003). This change was too radical in Argentina where populist movements under Peronism strongly supported unions and the lower classes. It brought confusion and conflict among the working classes. In this way, new organizations had to establish a new structure different from the CGT. They had to construct a new relationship with various social and political actors. These constituted the new social and political alliances, staged protests whose claims and ways of expression were novel, and participated in social conflict scenarios given in a context of increased and varied mobilization (Abal 2013). Moreover, the fragmentation of labor unions facilitated by Menem's neoliberal policies was featured with the creation of CTA (*Congreso de los Trabajadores Argentinos*), as the most influential labor unions that confronted the CGT. Derived from the CGT that tended to be subordinated by Menem's administration, the CTA criticized Menem's policies that diminished the importance of labor unions. The main focus of CTA was representation of informal labor sector and democratization within labor unions. (Svampa 2007) The confrontalista and CTA considered that the government should recognize the new socio-political demands from labor sectors and social organizations, as a consequence of the neoliberal structural changes.

As I mentioned above, it is important to notice that, given this low level of legitimacy, the Kirchner administration sought the support of social groups that shared its anti-neoliberal critique (Montero and Vincent 2013). Recognizing his political disadvantage, Kirchner's government moved quickly to ally with new social movement groups such as *los piqueteros* and informal sector labors. The traditional labor unions CGT and the newly organized labor groups such as CTA reoccupied a privileged position in the governing coalition. Between the period 2003 and 2011, labor unions and social movement groups (specifically *los piqueteros*) not only benefited from a context of economic recovery and low unemployment rates, but also encountered a Ministry of Labor that promoted collective bargaining and negotiation.

The reintegration of labor sector as a political coalition was a significant tactic for *kirchnerismo*. The data <Figure 1> indicate that the labor sector has enjoyed the most organization in Argentina, despite its dramatic decline during 1990's. Furthermore, sources from Universidad de Torcuato Di Tella (2011) and Etchemendy work (2011) argue that the increased wages and collective bargaining arrangements remain exceedingly high compared to other Latin American countries. The data show that in Argentina collective bargaining covers 80 percent of registered workers, while in Mexico the number is 17 percent and in Chile it is about 5.6 percent (Etchemendy 2011). In addition, the increase in wages is distinctive. In Argentina, from 2003 until 2011, labor unions achieved improved working conditions and increased wages 539 percent (Etchemendy 2011). By contrast, in Brazil, Lula da Silva's pro-labor union government achieved 100 percent increases during the same period and Chile and Mexico 26 percent and 39.6 percent respectively (Di Tella 2011). The dramatic increase in minimum wages indicates the importance of labor unions in Argentina. Most importantly, it was the mutual benefits for both Kirchner's administration and labor sector, as Kirchner gained political support while labor unions regained

its political authority.

Scholars such as Mazucca (2013) Wylde (2012) and Mario Damil and Roberto Frenkel (2013) who investigated the first term of Kirchner focus on positive macroeconomic performance due to commodity boom as a major factor in *kirchnerismo*. There was an average of 9 percent annual GDP growth between 2003 and 2007 and the unemployment rate decreased from 21.7 percent in 2003 to 9.9 percent in 2007 (Damill and Frenkel 2013). As <Figure 2> indicates, Argentina enjoyed a stable increase in GDP after 2003 that continued until the year 2011. Economic recovery was facilitated by a favorable exchange rate that boosted industrial production, and a battery of public subsidies covering energy, transportation, and food production (Calvo and Murillo 2012). This favorable context was possible due to the increase in soybean exportation. From 1989 to 2006, 94 percent of the soybean oil and 99 percent of the soy meal produced in Argentina were exported (Richardson 2008). By contrast, less than 15 percent of Argentine beef was exported between 1990 and 2005, down from 25 percent between 1965 and 1976 (Richardson 2008). Unlike real wage goods that provoked inflation in the Argentine domestic market, the soybean as a non-real wage goods had no direct effect on the real wages of the working class. If domestic consumers were sensitive with price changes in real wage goods (wine, beef and etc.), soybean was not an essential product that Argentines consumed. This was a key factor for Kirchner's administration to be successful with wealth distribution.

The labor sector, which had been damaged by Menem's neoliberal policies, was able to recuperate during this period. The <Figure 3> demonstrates that the minimum wage has rapidly increased during Kirchner's regime, about 820 percent between 2003 and 2011 and the number of collective agreement (*convenio acuerdo*) also increased from about 200 during Menem's period (1991-1999) to almost 1600 during Kirchner's administration (2003-2010), as indicated in

(see Figure 4). Etchemendy and Collier (2007) argue how unions backed the Kirchner government in exchange for favorable wage agreements. Increases in industrial production were accompanied by gains in industrial employment, which grew by almost twenty percent between 2003 and 2007 (Etchemendy and Collier 2007). Furthermore, retirement and pension income augmented from 150 to nearly 900 pesos and the unemployment rates dramatically decreased from 23 percent in 2003 to 6.9 percent in 2013 (Féliz and Perez 2010). Most benefits from the commodity boom targeted better conditions for working people, in exchange for strengthening Kirchner's political hegemony.

Although *kirchnerismo* announced the new politics separated from previous regimes, the clientelistic feature remained within the relationship between the government and the PJ. As a president that represents Peronism, Kirchner made few attempts to change clientelistic political structures. Instead of making reforms within the relationship between government and the PJ, he actively used the structures to strengthen his political authority. Just as Carlos Menem organized “*punteros*” as a political machine for the PJ, Castorina (2009) argues that Kirchner mobilized the *piqueteros K* as a show of force on several occasions, not only in electoral campaigns but also at public rallies where Kirchner could display wider popular support. She argues that the *piquetero K* became incorporated into the clientelistic networks of the government and very active in clientelistic practices (Castorina 2009). She describes corporatistic relationship in her literature:

“if you go to a *piquetero* mobilization, then they give the people some sugar, oil, spaghetti, or flour [...] there arrives an enormous amount of goods; trucks full of goods [...] and because of needs, people do mobilize themselves” (Castorina 2009).

This anecdote is very similar to Auyero's (2001) description of how Carlos Menem's *punteros* functioned as a political machine. In his ethnographic account, Auyero (2001) presents Norma as a “*puntera*” who works for the PJ:

“Every week, Norma’s Unidad Basica (UB) distributes powdered milk from the Programa Materno-Infantil (a nutritional program funded by the national welfare ministry) and food from the local municipality to more than fifty slum-dwellers. Norma explained, “every month, at the party meetings, the mayor informs us of the date when they are going to give out food at the municipality [...] we tell the neighbors. Because Norma is “just starting with this party thing,” her access to state resources is for the time being restricted.” (Auyero 2001)

Two anecdotes that describe Menem and Kirchner’s clientelism share core similarities. As Shapiro (2010) argues, the fact that poverty has been dominant in Argentine society made political machine politics a productive political business in populism. Although the degree of clientelism decreased during *kirchnerismo* largely due to the reduction of poverty, the patronage system remains visible as a tool to gain political support (Shapiro 2010).

Conclusion: Evaluation of Kirchnerismo and The Future of Populism

The unexpected emergence of Kirchner in 2003 surprised many people and raised questions of whether his administration would be successful, given that he had no strong political coalition and faced economic crisis. Despite those concerns, Kirchner was enabled to establish his doctrine called *kirchnerismo* and extended it to his wife, Cristina Fernandez Kirchner’s current government. In general, what *kirchnerismo* achieved were the restoration of political culture and the recognition of marginalized groups. It revalorized the meaning of labor and occupation in society, and represented the social actors that had been ignored by previous regimes.

However, in the later period of *kirchnerismo*, negative elements became apparent. First, Kirchner concentrated power in the executive branch and frequently circumvented, manipulated, or changed the rules of the game in pursuit of his objectives. The manipulation of statistical results on inflation is a good example of how *kirchnerismo* abused its executive power to avoid critics on its economic policy. In 2007, the government fixed the inflation index published by the National Statistical Institute (INDEC), which is an institution that gathers results on other many

economic indicators. The false inflation rate confused foreign investors and had impacts on other economic indicators such as poverty rates and the GDP. The *kirchnerismo* was also accused of infringing upon the freedom of the media, revealing the abuse of executive power in the current regime. In conclusion, the maximization of the political autonomy and plurality (or diversity) of interests was the essential motor and the goal of constructing *kirchnerismo*. Yet, when encountered with limits to accomplish its goals, Kirchner became more radicalized and populist, polarizing political arena.

Current Situation: The End of Kirchnerismo and The Future of Argentine Politics

On the 31st of January 2014, *La Nación* reported that the Argentine *peso* lost 23 percent of its value in a month. It was the biggest loss of value in a month since 2002, making Argentines concerned about another imminent financial crisis. The dramatic downfall of the *peso*'s value triggered the current president Cristina Fernandez's approval number fall to around 30 percent, a huge decline from almost 65 percent in 2010. Her controversial political style and failure to control inflation disappointed her supporters and were reflected in the legislative election in October 2013, as her political party FPV (Front for Victory) lost a large number of seats and conceded a landslide victory for non-Kirchner candidate Sergio Massa in Buenos Aires province. The results from the election in October 2013 also barred Cristina from considering a constitutional amendment allowing her to run for a third term in 2015. Thus, many critics argue that these signals allow us to predict that *kirchnerismo* is losing its political popularity.

Post-*kirchnerismo* will not eschew populism by reducing hyper-presidentialism and corruption, while strengthening accountability and government effectiveness. Massa's political party, FR (Renewal Front), embraces political agendas that are more conservative and moderate than that of center-left *kirchnerismo*. But, it is important to note that Massa's center-right

political discourse operates within the framework of populism. Whether another candidate from Kirchner's regime or Sergio Massa wins the presidential election in 2015, the elements of populism will persist in Argentina.


Appendix

<Figure 1: Trade Union Density>

Country	Peak ISI-era trade union density	Trade Union density in 2005	Change in trade union density
Argentina	50.10%	21.00%	-29.10%
Nicaragua	37.30%	15.00%	-22.30%
Chile	35%	10.00%	-25.00%
Mexico	32.10%	15.00%	-17.10%
Venezuela	26.40%	11.00%	-15.40%
Peru	25.00%	5.00%	-21.00%
Bolivia	24.80%	7.50%	-17.30%
Brazil	24.30%	16.00%	-8.30%
Uruguay	20.90%	15.00%	-5.90%
Dominican Republic	17.00%	8.00%	-9.00%
Panama	17%	10.00%	-7.00%
Costa Rica	15.40%	12.00%	-3.40%
Ecuador	13.50%	5.00%	-8.50%
Paraguay	9.90%	10.00%	0.10%
Colombia	9.20%	4.00%	-5.20%
Honduras	8.50%	7.30%	-1.20%
Average	22.9	10.70%	-12.20%


Sources: Roberts Kenneth's Research Data from OECD statistics

<Figure 2: Evolution of GDP, 1993-2011>




Source: PNUD

<Figure 3: Evolution of Minimum Wage 2003-2011>



Source: PNUD

<Figure 4: Evolution of Number of Agreements>



Source: PNUD

Bibliography:

- Abal, Paula. "Sindicalismo y mundo trabajador en la Argentina reciente"
La forma Sindical en Latinoamérica (2013)
- Auyero, Javier. *La política de los pobres: las prácticas clientelistas del peronismo*. Ediciones Manantial, 2001.
- Auyero, Javier, Pablo Lapegna, and Fernanda Page Poma. "Patronage politics and contentious collective action: a recursive relationship." *Latin American Politics and Society* 51.3 (2009): 1-31.
- Azpiazu, Daniel, Eduardo Basualdo, and Martín Schorr. "La industria argentínadurante los años noventa: profundización y consolidación de los rasgos centrales de la dinámica sectorial post-sustitutiva." Buenos Aires: FLACSO(2001).
- Biglieri, Paula. *En el nombre del pueblo: la emergencia del populismo kirchnerista*. Buenos Aires: Unsam, 2007.
- Cammack, Paul. "The resurgence of populism in Latin America." *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 19.2 (2000): 149-161.
- Calvo, Ernesto, and M. Victoria Murillo. "Selecting clients: Partisan networks and the electoral benefits of targeted distribution." *Comparative Politics Workshop, Yale University*. Vol. 11. 2009.
- Castorina, Emilia. "Center-left (neo) populism: The case of Kirchner." *21st IPSA World Congress, Santiago, Chile*. 2009.
- Castiglioni, Franco. "Argentina. Política y economía en el menemismo." *Nueva Sociedad* 143 (1996).
- Clarín. Various issues/years. November 1997-August 2013
- Corrales, Javier. "The Backlash against Market Reforms and The Left in Latin America in the 2000s." (2006): 1-24.
- Damill, Mario, and Roberto Frenkel. "La economía argentina bajo los Kirchner: una historia de dos lustros1."
- De Luca, Miguel. *La política en tiempos de los Kirchner*. Eudeba, Editorial Universitaria de Buenos Aires, 2011.
- De Piero, Sergio. "Los años Kirchneristas: recentralizar el Estado." *Revista Aportes* 18.30 (2012): 169-180.
- Di Tella, Torcuato S. "Working-Class Organization and Politics in Argentina." *Latin American Research Review* 16.2 (2011): 33-56.
- Dornbusch, Rudiger, and Sebastian Edwards, eds. *The macroeconomics of populism in Latin America*. University of Chicago Press, 2007.
- Edwards, Sebastian. *Left behind: Latin America and the false promise of populism*. University of Chicago press, 2010.
- Etchemendy, Sebastián, and Ruth Berins Collier. "Down but not out: Union resurgence and segmented neocorporatism in Argentina (2003–2007)." *Politics & Society* 35.3 (2007): 363-401.
- Etchemendy, Sebastián, and Vicente Palermo. "Conflicto y concertación. Gobierno, Congreso y organizaciones de interés en la reforma laboral del primer gobierno de Menem (1989-1995)." *Desarrollo económico* (1998): 559-590.
- Fair, Hernán. "El proceso de reformas estructurales en Argentina: Un análisis del primer gobierno de Menem." *OIKOS* 25 (2008).

- Féliz, Mariano. "Neo-developmentalism: Beyond Neoliberalism? Capitalist Crisis and Argentinas Development since the 1990s." *Historical Materialism* 20.2 (2012): 105-123.
- Gerchunoff, Pablo, and Juan Carlos Torre. "La política de liberalización económica en la administración de Menem." *Desarrollo Económico* (1996): 733-768.
- Germani, Gino. *Authoritarianism, fascism, and national populism*. Transaction Publishers, 1978.
- Helmke, Gretchen, and Steven Levitsky. "Informal institutions and comparative politics: A research agenda." *Perspectives on politics* 2.04 (2004): 725-740.
- INDEC, Índice de Precios al Consumidor Gran Buenos Aires Documento Metodológico Nro 13, Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censo, 2001.
- Laclau, Ernesto. *La razón populista*. Fondo de cultura Económica, 2006.
- Levitsky, Steven, and Kenneth M. Roberts, eds. *The resurgence of the Latin American left*. JHU Press, 2013.
- Levitsky, Steven, and Maria Victoria Murillo, eds. *Argentine democracy: the politics of institutional weakness*. Penn State Press, 2005.
- Levitsky, Steven, and Maxwell A. Cameron. "Democracy without parties? Political parties and regime change in Fujimori's Peru." *Latin American Politics and Society* 45.3 (2003): 1-33.
- Mazzuca, Sebastián L. "The Rise of Rentier Populism." *Journal of Democracy* 24.2 (2013): 108-122.
- McGuire, James W. *Peronism without Perón: Unions, parties, and democracy in Argentina*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997.
- Murillo, Maria Victoria, Virginia Oliveros, and Milan Vaishnav. "Voting for the Left or Governing on the Left?." *Latin America's Left Turn: Causes and Implications. Unpublished typescript, Harvard University* (2008).
- Murillo, Maria Victoria "Argentina: From kirchner to kirchner." *Journal of Democracy* 19.2 (2008): 16-30.
- Novick, Marta. "¿ Emerge un nuevo modelo económico y social? El caso argentino 2003- 2006." *Revista Latinoamericana de Estudios del Trabajo (RELET)* 11.18 (2006): 53-78.
- Novaro, Marcos. "Izquierda y populismo en la política argentina." *Pérez Herrero, P.(Comp.), La izquierda en América Latina* (2006): 115-190.
- O'Donnell, Guillermo A. "Delegative democracy." *Journal of democracy* 5.1 (1994): 55-69.
- Pagni, Carolos. "LA CRISIS ARGENTINA: El experimento populista de los Kirchner." *Cuadernos de Pensamiento Político* (2012): 97-112.
- Panizza, Francisco. *Contemporary Latin America: development and democracy beyond the Washington consensus*. Zed Books, 2009.
- _____. *El populismo como espejo de la democracia*. Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2009.
- Pereyra, Guillermo. "Límites y posibilidades del discurso populista." *Utopía y Praxis Latinoamericana* 17.58 (2012): 11-26.
- Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo, Argentina, 2013
- Portes, Alejandro, and Kelly Hoffman. "Latin American class structures: Their composition and change during the neoliberal era." *Latin American Research Review* 38.1 (2003): 41-82.

- Pucciarelli, Alfredo R. *Los años de Menem: la construcción del orden neoliberal*. Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 2011.
- Richardson, Neal P. "Export-oriented populism: commodities and coalitions in Argentina." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 44.3 (2009): 228-255.
- Rinesi, Eduardo. "Notas para una caracterización del kirchnerismo." *Debates y combates* 1 (2011).
- Roberts, Kenneth M. "Latin America's populist revival." *Sais Review* 27.1 (2007): 3-15.
- _____. "Populism and democracy in Latin America." *Conference on "Challenges to Democracy in the Americas", Carter Center, Atlanta*. 2000.
- _____. "Populism, political conflict, and grass-roots organization in Latin America." *Comparative Politics* (2006): 127-148.
- Schamis, Hector E. "Argentina's Troubled Transition." *CURRENT HISTORY* 107.706 (2008): 71-76.
- Seligson, Mitchell A. "The rise of populism and the left in Latin America." *Journal of Democracy* 18.3 (2007): 81-95.
- Sidicaro, Ricardo. "El partido peronista y los gobiernos kirchneristas." *Nueva Sociedad* 234 (2011).
- Stokes, Susan C. "Perverse accountability: A formal model of machine politics with evidence from Argentina." *American Political Science Review* 99.03 (2005): 315-325.
- Svampa, Maristella. "Las fronteras del Gobierno de Kirchner: entre la consolidación de lo viejo y las aspiraciones de lo nuevo." *Cuadernos del CENDES* 24.65 (2007): 39-61.
- Svampa, Maristella. "The end of Kirchnerism." *New Left Review* 53 (2008): 79-95.
- Szwarcberg, Mariela L. "Clientelismo en democracia: lecciones del caso argentino." *Nueva sociedad* 225 (2010): 139-155.
- Torre, Juan Carlos 1990 *La vieja guardia sindical y Perón. Sobre los orígenes del peronismo*, Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana-Instituto Torcuato De Tella
- Weitz-Shapiro, Rebecca. *Choosing clientelism: political competition, poverty, and social welfare policy in Argentina*. Diss. Columbia University, 2008.
- Weyland, Kurt. "Clarifying a contested concept: Populism in the study of Latin American politics." *Comparative politics* (2001): 1-22.
- _____. "Neopopulism and neoliberalism in Latin America: Unexpected affinities." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 31.3 (1996): 3-31.
- Wylde, Christopher, "State, society and Markets in Argentina: The Political economy of neodesarrollismo under Nestor Kirchner, 2003-2007." *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 2p.4 (2011): 436-45