Trading Spaces:

The Endogenous Dynamics of Subnational Authoritarianism in Brazil

Alfred P. Montero
Associate Professor
Carleton College
One North College St.
Northfield MN 55057
amontero@carleton.edu

Abstract

This study demonstrates that factors endogenous to subnational politics are more consistent predictors of electoral dominance (subnational authoritarianism) in the Brazilian states during the democratic period (the New Republic) than exogenous factors such as the institutional and partisan influence of presidents, dependence on fiscal transfers (rentier factors), and social spending. Endogenous factors challenge exogenous theory by expanding the conception of territory to include conflicts over space and spatial variables affecting the costs of organizational mobilization. The study employs statistical and spatial analysis of original state-level and municipal-level datasets, as well as a paired comparison of two key cases, Bahia and Maranhão.
One of the core disappointments of the first two decades of Brazilian democracy following the transition in 1985 was the juxtaposition of national democratic institutions for the country and the continuation of semi- and undemocratic governments in some states. Numerous scholars of the New Republic, the name of the regime, concluded that Brazil’s democracy was hard-wired to produce the continuity of conservative rule (Hagopian 1996; Power 2000). Central to these views was the entrenched nature of the country’s clientelist politics, and particularly in the poorer states of the Northeast (Ames 2001). The accidental presidency of José Sarney (1985-1990), himself an ally of the military as long-time governor of Maranhão, and the election of his successor, Fernando Collor (1990-1992), the scion of a landed political clan from the poor Northeastern state of Alagoas, reinforced expectations of continued conservative rule. Even the election of successive two-term presidents with bona fides as opponents of authoritarianism, Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1994-2002) and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2010), could not remove the impression of continued conservative entrenchment, particularly in the old redoubts of clientelist machine politics in the Northeast. Few observers of Brazil believed that the democratization of the country could loosen the grip that local bosses maintained on their bailiwicks in states such as Bahia, Maranhão, Ceará, and Alagoas. Yet in the election of 2006, not only did the left-of-center Lula win re-election, a host of leftists gained control of state governorships in the poor states, overturning political machines in several of them.

The events of the 2006 contest seem to confirm that “subnational authoritarian” polities can be democratized through the strategies of national leaders. Following these elections, numerous observers argued that national policies during the first term of Lula’s government had weakened the clientele networks of conservatives (Fenwick 2010). This was unsurprising given that Lula, as the leader of the Workers’ Party (PT), was a committed opponent of conservatives, and especially those who had ties to the military governments that ran the country from 1964 to 1985. Unlike Cardoso, Lula’s government eschewed alliances with conservative parties such as the Liberal Front Party (PFL) and subnational bosses such as the long-time head of the Bahian political machine, Antônio Carlos Magalhães (ACM). Moreover, Lula’s economic and social policies threatened the powerbase of conservative rule in the poor states by lifting citizens out of poverty, thereby devaluing the erstwhile monopoly these leaders had through their control of state offices, public services, and other patronage. Thus freed of their socio-economic isolation, clients could be transformed into citizens and autonomously select leftists to replace conservative bosses in states such as Bahia, Ceará, and Maranhão.

What first appears as confirmation that only intergovernmental pressures can weaken subnational authoritarianism is in reality a more complex story about how subnational clientele networks and opposition strategies adapt to engineer unexpected political shifts. This study will demonstrate that both clientelism and the strategy of opposition in the redoubts of conservative rule in Brazil are delimited spatially in ways that are more inelastic to intergovernmental pressures than scholars of subnational authoritarianism normally assume. Consequently, the
study challenges these theories’ exogenous determinants by underscoring how factors endogenous to subnational polities explain change in erstwhile subnational authoritarian regimes.

Established approaches to subnational authoritarianism operate with several theoretical and empirical assumptions that are insufficient for understanding the Brazilian cases. The first of these is well-articulated in Gibson’s (2005: 105) seminal study as the problematization of territory. Following Tarrow (1978), Gibson argues that a focus on the territorial dimensions of the democratic state requires an understanding of patterns of relations between national and subnational government. Thus conflict and cooperation across territory is the essence of territorial politics. This treats geographic factors as an arena, but there are at least two other formulations of territorial politics that are relevant to the dynamics of subnational authoritarianism: (1) territory as an object of conflict and (2) territory as a factor in conflict. Treating territory as an arena favors the role of causal factors exogenous to the subnational polity, as Gibson’s original work demonstrates. But such a study commits omitted variable bias by not engaging the other two representations of space in politics that play fundamental roles in shaping democratic politics. Territory as object focuses on how the distribution of votes is spatially concentrated and how that condition determines the relative vulnerability and strategy of politicians and parties as they compete for support in the bailiwicks of their rivals. This “fight for space” approach is reflected in Barry Ames’ (2001) study of political domination and horizontal coverage of the vote in Brazil. Below, I discuss Ames’ approach and compare it to the territory-as-factor perspective, which holds that space is a determinant of outcomes in political competition. Following Ames, I argue that territory affects the distribution of the vote and political agents’ strategic choices, but this requires more than the study of patterns of political domination. It requires the unpacking of a larger range of factors that are imbedded in space such as distance, ease of transport, quality of access, demographic characteristics of space, and other locational aspects that affect the relative costs of different strategic options for politicians and their parties.

The control of area in cases of “subnational authoritarianism” is not simply about the closing down of resources in the intergovernmental arena to local oppositions; what Gibson calls “boundary control.” It also requires an understanding of the other two dimensions of territorial politics. In Brazil, the clientele networks that are the lifeblood of conservative rule depend upon the maintenance of local monopolies over resources that make vote-buying and coercion accurate predictors of electoral turnout and results. Following Ames (2001), incumbents distribute patronage strategically in defense of their bailiwicks. But other factors imbedded in space also matter in determining how viable these and other alternative strategies are given location, demographics, development, communication, and concentration of resources. Clientelist monopolies are strongest where conservatives can isolate their subjects, oversee their electoral behavior, and credibly threaten them if they renege on their vote-buying contracts (Magaloni, Diaz-Cayeros, and Estévez 2007; Medina and Stokes 2007). The typical locational aspects that accompany these conditions are rural, impoverished, sparsely populated areas, with poor
communications that are distant from the main urban centers. Clientele networks in this territorial context may be resistant to shifts in resources either within the subnational polity or on the intergovernmental dimension. The continuity of these bases can guarantee conservatives a floor of support that helps some retain their control over the state apparatus and resist challenges from political rivals within the polity. So even if factors exogenous to the subnational polity increased competitiveness (democratization) overall, enclaves within the territory of the state would remain in the clutches of subnational authoritarianism nonetheless.

An expansion of our understanding of territorial politics must also accommodate the role of agents within subnational polities who are capable of shifting resources and changing institutions to improve their strategic position. Conservative incumbents have the advantage of maintaining decentralized clientele networks with ties being delegated to local officials. These ties are also largely informal and long-term, relying on previous personal and fraternal contacts that are periodically reinforced by the distribution of patronage. And while the locational characteristics of these networks afford incumbents a defensible bailiwick, it allows the opposition to organize in other places that provide their own strategic advantages. This is especially the case of conservatives’ most avowed opponents, leftist parties. Unlike the center-right parties, leftist organizations are less likely to collaborate actively with conservatives to allow their political machines to run subnational authoritarian polities. Because leftist oppositions in Brazil have historically had to organize support outside of these clientele networks and succeed despite them, they have pursued alternative mobilizational strategies and in urban locations. The urban context is crucial to the strategic position of leftists, especially in the poor states of the Northeast in Brazil because these are places where organized allies such as unions and consumer organizations, middle sector groups, and intellectuals reside. The costs of mobilizing these actors and expanding the base from the urban core are comparatively low to fostering opposition in the fallow soil of the interior that has historically been in the hands of local bosses who support the incumbent machine. Consequently, the distribution of support is spatially delimited in ways in which territory is an object of campaign strategy and a factor in the relative costs of campaigning.

The current study tests the explanatory power of factors emanating from all three formulations of territorial politics. In the next section, I operationalize subnational authoritarianism in Brazil during most of the New Republic and I examine exogenous and endogenous approaches to explain change over time and across cases. Exogenous arguments favor the territory-as-arena approach while endogenous arguments employ the territory-as-object and territory-as-factor perspectives. The subsequent section provides a statistical analysis of each approach as well as a qualitative paired comparison using spatial analysis to explore the arguments with greater precision. The final section provides conclusions.
The Dynamics of Subnational Authoritarianism in Brazil

Subnational authoritarian regimes are derivations of what a diverse literature terms “hybrid” or “illiberal” regimes and “competitive authoritarianism” (cf. Diamond 2002; Levitsky and Way 2002; Howard and Roessler 2006). These regimes maintain elections, are generally not repressive, and have opposition parties that are eligible to compete for office. However, the range of political competition is parochialized to a small cadre of elites who have shared interests in limiting access to public office to all but those loyal to them. These polities are, in the words of Kelly McMann (2006: 180-1), “strong in participation, weak on contestation.”

Measuring subnational authoritarianism is the focus of much debate in the emerging literature, but some indicators are typically mentioned by the available studies of the phenomenon. Most of these focus on electoral outcomes, notably long mandates, large margins for incumbents, executive dominance over the legislature, and high re-election rates (cf. Goldberg, Wibbels, and Mvukiyehe 2008; Gervasoni 2010: 315). Using these measures of limited contestation, I construct an index to list the 26 Brazilian states from least competitive to most competitive. Drawing on Gervasoni (2010) and Borges (2007), the index is based on a single-factor score from a principal components analysis of four measures of contestation: the proportion of the valid vote won by the incumbent party or coalition in the first round of the gubernatorial elections, succession control (coded as 1 = governorship is lost to opposition, 2 = incumbent is succeeded by co-partisan or similar political family, 3 = incumbent is re-elected or returns to office in a non-consecutive term if previously served), and the percentage of seats in the state assembly won by the governor’s party and party coalition. The index pools data from four elections (1990, 1994, 1998, and 2002). It excludes the 1982 and 1986 contests due to different electoral rules, party systems, and the exclusion of new states. The index also omits the contest of 2006 since that one was relatively more competitive (Borges 2007: 113). The analysis produced one significant factor (2.27 eigenvalue with a 1.504 difference over the second eigenvalue). The result is a baseline ranking of “electoral dominance.”

Table 1 places at the top of the list what scholars of Brazil routinely report as the least competitive polities. Most of these are located in the Northeast region, the most notoriously clientelistic area of the country (Ames 2001). Not one state from the more populated and developed southern or southeastern regions appears in the top 14 entries. The first eleven slots on the list include the only four states to never have a second-round contest for governor (Mato Grosso, Alagoas, Pernambuco, and Amazonas). With the exception of Paraíba, these states all re-elected governors at least once (five did twice, and one, Amazonas, did so three times). The dominant parties in these states tend to be the right-wing PFL (Party of the Liberal Front/Partido da Frente Liberal) and the center-right PMDB (Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement/Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro), commensurate with the conservative profile of these cases. The center-left social democratic PSDB (Party of Brazilian Social
Democracy/Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira), which is dominant in only the case of Ceará, elected a winning governor only five times (including one re-election) in the other states placed within the least competitive cohort. The leftist PT captured no governorships and it found itself in only four partisan coalitions of successful candidates in this group prior to 2006. In virtually all cases, conservative candidates and right-wing parties retained control of the governorships of these states.

The legislative profile of these elections follows the dynamics of the governor’s races with average seat shares for the winning coalition supporting the gubernatorial candidate standing at about half of each state assembly (49.9 percent). By contrast, the same figure for the bottom eleven entries on Table 1 is just over half that amount (27.8 percent). This is an indicator of the incentives even minor parties have for forging alliances to winning gubernatorial candidates as this allows them to make claims on the governor’s largesse, an essential factor in shaping political careers (Samuels 2003). But it is notable that the Northeastern states stand-out in this regard for the high average concentration of gubernatorial bandwagoning.

As indicated above, the relative strength and geographic distribution of subnational authoritarian regimes in the context of national democracies can be determined by exogenous factors, determinants concerning electoral strategy of subnational politicians, and spatial dynamics that are endogenous to subnational politics. The next two subsections contrasts these approaches and applies them to generate explanations for observed patterns of electoral dominance in the Brazilian states.

**Exogenous Factor Arguments**

Exogenous factors focus on patterns of relations between national and subnational government. The most fundamental one is that nationally elected leaders protect subnational authoritarian enclaves and receive political support in return (Gibson 2005: 107-108; Snyder 2001). Governors often control significant policy resources and patronage that make them brokers in national legislative and bureaucratic politics, thereby becoming important allies to presidents (Samuels 2003; Diaz-Cayeros 2006). Presidents may also be motivated by the need to forestall the rise of potential rivals in future elections by guaranteeing their gubernatorial allies’ job security at the subnational level and thus weakening their ambitions for higher office (Giraudy 2010; Cornelius 1999). Both possibilities rely on the use of federal resources to preserve subnational authoritarians in power according to logics driven by strategies of national politics. Therefore the distribution of resources mediated by the strategic interests of national incumbents should shape the opportunity structures of partisan competition at the subnational level. Specifically, there should be a limitation on competition precisely where there is collaboration between national and subnational incumbents. Subnational authoritarians should be able to deliver votes to national incumbents and be paid for their services with resource transfers that consolidate their power.
Subnational opposition can also play the same game by eliciting the support of national leaders, though they play from an inferior position. As an opposition, they cannot guarantee that they will gain control of the subnational government. They therefore have less to offer national leaders than authoritarian incumbents do. Gibson (2005: 103) argues that incumbents prevail when they can delimit the scope of conflict to local resource availability and keep the opposition from gaining access to national levels of support. Effective “boundary control” thus undercuts the credibility of the opposition as a viable future partner to presidents. But it is a variable, nonetheless, that can be undone by concerted action. For example, Giraudy (2010) ascribes more control to national leaders, who can break through subnational incumbents’ boundary control given sufficient resource transfers to the opposition.

In Brazil, the interplay of national strategic interests and subnational boundary control has not always explained the behavior or even the survival of subnational governments. Brazilian presidents have cultivated the support of governors, often of different political inclinations to their own, but the pattern of these alliances have been too intermittent and dispersed to explain the dynamics of conservative rule. For example, Fernando Henrique Cardoso garnered the support of conservatives in the PFL, including the Bahian leader, ACM, but he picked battles with conservative governors in other Northeastern states who opposed his limitations on state budgets and indebtedness, and in ways that were detrimental to his electoral position in the Northeast and that of his candidate for the presidency in 2002, José Serra (Eaton and Dickovick 2004). The effectiveness of boundary control has also been questionable. For example, Lula supported the conservative, Roseana Sarney, in the 2006 gubernatorial contest in Maranhão to reinforce support for the president’s legislation from the Senate president, José Sarney, her father. The leftist opposition led by Jackson Lago (PDT) in alliance with Lula’s PT won anyway.

One of the reasons why the continuation of anti-competitive subnational incumbents cannot be assured is that, unlike those in Mexico and Argentina, the Brazilian political machines lack access to hegemonic parties that are able to engage in dominant “area control” as Gibson (2005: 109-110) describes it. As indicated above, the parochialization of power is a reality of conservative rule in the poor states of the Northeast especially, but that limitation on opposition is based on the persistence of clientele networks, which have historically resisted partisan institutionalization (Diniz 1982; Mainwaring 1999). As Table 1 shows, party alliances are oriented around winning governors and less their parties (Samuels 2003). When conservative parties lose, the underlying clientele networks that once supported them can shift their loyalties or regroup to fight off the opposition in the next cycle. In the case of Maranhão, the sarneyistas did not wait for the next election. The machine regrouped, this time without Lula’s direct assistance and under different party labels (the PMDB rather than the PFL), and used a court challenge to strip Lago of his mandate not two and a half years into his term.

National governments are also institutionally linked to subnational polities in ways that make subnational authoritarianism strong or weak. Gervasoni (2010) applies the logic of the rentier state to explain variations in democratic quality in Argentina based on the nature, origin,
and size of provincial revenues. He argues that the more a subnational government receives subsidies and fiscal transfers from the central government and has less need of cultivating its own tax revenues, the greater its autonomy from society. Having access to abundant unearned resources, rentier-like subnational governments are free to spend on a growing class of public employees who depend on the largesse of political benefactors. In this context, it is difficult for oppositions to emerge from political bases independent of the state (McMann 2006). Nor will civil societies who are lightly taxed be inclined to support a change (Ross 2004). In short, rentier subnational regimes have effective boundary control. Whatever the means for creating political hegemony, the size and scope of fiscal transfers as a means for financing subnational government is associated with autocracy (Gervasoni 2010: 309).

The rentier logic for fiscal transfers seems to fit the Brazilian cases well. The states of the Northeast and North are, on balance, the heaviest recipients of constitutionally mandated fiscal transfers. Under the 1988 Constitution, about 80-90 percent of these transfers are unearmarked, a figure similar to the provincial share in the Argentine cases (Montero 2000: 65; Gervasoni 2010: 313). Having little need to provide quality services in return for taxes, the political classes of these states have focused their unearned income on the purchase of political support through pervasive vote-buying (Nichter 2009; Souza 2009).

The rentier logic explains resource autonomy but it is insufficient for explaining why such autonomy reinforces authoritarianism. In Brazil, states such as Piauí and Pará in the Northeast and North, respectively, are situated towards the bottom of the list for electoral dominance (see Table 1), yet they retain high levels of dependence on fiscal transfers. These two states depend on fiscal transfers for just over 50 percent of their revenues compared to Rio de Janeiro’s 23 percent. But Rio has a higher average electoral dominance score. Both of the poor states in question have elected PT governorships (Pará did so in 2006 and Piauí did so in 2002 and 2006), an unlikely outcome in the most conservative region of Brazil. And despite an unchanged fiscal structure, these governments have not deviated from the norm of PT governorships by becoming more autocratic. Arguably these governors have made these states far more competitive since taking office.

If the experiences of Piauí and Pará were more solitary, they could be discounted as outliers. But as I indicate above, more recent elections have seemingly eroded the electoral dominance of several political machines, especially in the Northeast. Since 2002, states such as Bahia, Maranhão, Ceará, and Sergipe, where erstwhile conservative-dominated politics have limited electoral competition during the New Republic, leftists especially have gained control of governorships and expanded seat shares in state assemblies. Though exogenous explanations of subnational authoritarianism emphasize the “reproduction” and continuation of these regimes, studies more focused on the Brazilian cases have tended to try to explain the dynamics of these polities given these recent changes (cf. Borges 2007; Souza 2009; Montero 2010).
The prominent exogenous factor explanation emerging from this literature is the claim that the federalization of social spending, especially through Lula da Silva’s landmark social program, the *Bolsa Família* (Family Grant, BF), undermined the monopoly of subnational machines over a crucial source of material inducements to clients (Borges 2007; Souza 2009; Fenwick 2010; Soares and Terron 2008: 281). By providing a cash transfer of up to $60 USD (120 BRL) to households if children are kept in school, given regular medical care and immunizations, the BF improved the life chances of the poor, enabling them to become more politically autonomous. Universal criteria for eligibility and municipal implementation served to avoid gubernatorial influence, which would otherwise misappropriate these resources to shore up their own and their allies’ electoral dominance (Zucco 2008; Fenwick 2009, 2010; Borges 2007).

Furthermore, by channeling resources in a targeted way to the poor, and especially those residing in the backwater *grotões* of the poorest states of the North and Northeast, the BF undermined clientele networks where they have historically been strongest. Drawing on Gibson (2005), this effectively weakened conservatives’ boundary controls.

To summarize, the present study will test the role of three exogenous factors: political ties to the president, the role of fiscal transfers as a proxy for the strength of incumbents’ boundary controls and the *rentier* logic, and the coverage of *Bolsa Família* as a proxy for the opposition’s ability to benefit from the weakening of the subnational incumbent’s boundary controls.

*Endogenous Factor Arguments*

Exogenous arguments operate with a theory of political territory as *arena* rather than territory as the object of conflict or space as a factor in conflict. Consequently, they commit omitted variable bias by not taking into account predictors of electoral dominance that are endogenous to subnational regimes. To operationalize territory as an object of conflict, Ames (2001) defines two dimensions: (1) “vertical penetration” (domination) and (2) “horizontal coverage” (contiguity). Domination refers to a given candidate’s share of the vote per municipality weighted by the percentage of the candidate’s total vote the municipality represents. Horizontal coverage is the clustering of support for a candidate across neighboring (contiguous) municipalities. Ames argues that patterns of domination and clustering throughout Brazil determine candidate strategies. For instance, where dominance is high, rivals are unlikely to expend scarce resources. Where dominance patterns are low and/or scattered, incumbents are more vulnerable. In this way, Ames demonstrates how a competition for votes is a competition for space.

Ames’ approach is well-adapted to Brazil, but his analysis of the politics of space is too focused on rational strategies selected by politicians based on patterns of previous voting. He does not fully consider how *spatial variables* influence conflict over space, specifically the costs
of pursuing particular campaign and party-building strategies. These considerations are less meaningful for the catch-all parties in Brazil since individual politicians tend to be more important decision-makers than their organizations. However, leftist parties, and especially the PT, are more programmatic. These organizations pursue campaign and electoral strategies in which spatial factors weigh more heavily.

What is striking about the listing on Table 1 is that the cases of high electoral dominance have political-historical and geographic similarities that suggest not only why they would have less competitive regimes but also why and how they would change in recent electoral cycles. The states of the Northeast in particular that are situated at the top of the list have had the most concentrated forms of political dominance under the control of conservatives. Clientele networks in these cases are decentralized and highly dependent on the distribution of patronage from the governor’s office. Conservative parties are oriented toward control of the executive for this very reason (Power 1996; Mainwaring, Meneguello, and Power 2000). This is in contrast to leftist parties, which are the primary forces that have dislocated conservatives from power in recent elections and especially in 2006. Leftist parties in Brazil typically rely on mobilizational strategies. They cultivate activism from below in their organizational structures by focusing on constant participation in the mission of building the party (Keck 1992: 79; Mainwaring 1999: 165-66). By contrast, conservative parties require only intermittent contact with local supporters to distribute material rewards in the form of a combination of public and private goods in payment for past and future support (Mainwaring 1999: 167). Mostly devoid of ideological appeals, conservatives purchase their support dearly but such payment assures more predictable results come election day.

The differences in strategy between capital-intensive distribution of patronage by conservative and catch-all parties and labor-intensive mobilization by leftist parties set up spatially delimited strategies for campaigns and party-building more generally. In reality, the organization of conservative rule is itself spatially imbedded as the right retains control over poor interior districts (os grotões) making it difficult for leftist parties to mobilize support in a sustainable fashion in these areas. Small populations, high levels of poverty, and poor communications with more developed urban centers make it possible for local bosses and conservative party leaders to isolate clients and tie them into enforceable vote-buying contracts. Leftist politicians gravitate towards urban areas where larger populations are both harder for conservatives to buy and therefore inherently more competitive polities for leftists to organize within (Ames 2001: 99-100). Leftist organizations such as the PT have long depended upon the support of organized interests such as unions, middle-class professional groups, and intellectuals, who party leaders view as a reliable base (Hunter 2007:453). Such organized, grassroots support is more likely to be located in urban zones. Finally, since leftist parties rely more heavily on the mobilization of supporters, urban bases afford these organizations better logistical assets, including short average distances, better road transportation, and more reliable telecommunications used to maintain frequent face-to-face contacts at relatively low cost.
The organizational and spatial logics described above challenge exogenous approaches to electoral dominance since they suggest that factors specific to states in the Northeast especially, such as the role of conservatives and their leftist opponents, have shaped political opportunity structures most consistently. In the statistical analysis that follows, I test several of the indicators for exogenous and endogenous factors as predictors of electoral dominance. Some of these variables may be tested by analyzing time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) data. Other variables, such as the Bolsa Família, are too recent to employ in the longitudinal comparisons. This factor will be assessed along with spatial variables in a cross-sectional comparison in the subsequent section. Consequently, the methodological approach taken in this study is to conduct separate statistical and spatial analyses comparing exogenous and endogenous factors in each.

The Study

The Statistical Analysis

If exogenous factors are robust predictors of electoral dominance, national-level politics should shape the political opportunity structures of subnational regimes. First, this means that partisan coalitions in subnational politics should be driven by national/presidential preferences based on partisanship and other ties. Second, rentier logics should hold in that states with a greater dependence on constitutionally-mandated fiscal transfers should have higher levels of electoral dominance. If endogenous factors matter more, variables that are proxies for the particular structure of political opportunities at the subnational level should prove more consistent and robust than intergovernmental determinants. The influence of governors over the political careers of federal politicians, regardless of presidential preferences, is one such indicator (Samuels 2000, 2003). The role of subnational conservative rule in propagating electoral dominance regardless of the ideological tendency of the president is another. Finally, from the perspective of exogenous approaches, regional differences should not matter given that intergovernmental pressures provide for systemic influence.

Finding a correlation between the opportunity structures of partisan competition in Brazil is challenging given that parties are weak. No hegemonic partisan organizations are available at either the national or the subnational levels to shape a strong intergovernmental linkage. A more appropriate analytical frame for the Brazilian case is to ask to what extent subnational elites attempt to improve their chances of re-election by seeking the support of presidents and vice versa (Samuels 2003). In this regard, career pathways and influence should reflect institutional and empirical power structures, a point made by much of the literature on decentralization and federalism in Latin America (cf. Montero and Samuels 2004; Willis, Garman, and Haggard 1999).

Drawing on a study of national and subnational “coattails” effects done by David Samuels (2000), this study operationalizes intergovernmental electoral linkages in Brazil through the coincidence of the effective number of party lists. We can expect that the relative
competitiveness of each subnational polity is shaped by the coalition dynamics behind the 2 to 4 viable candidates for governor in each election since 1994. From that time, presidential contests have run concurrently with those of the governors and the federal deputies of the lower house of the Congress. Accounting for differences in district magnitude (M), Samuels (2000) demonstrates that gubernatorial coattails and not presidential coattails determine the effective number of electoral lists (ENEL) for the lower house, a finding that underscores the dependence of political careers on gubernatorial and not presidential politics. If intergovernmental linkages allow presidents to shape subnational regime dynamics, we would expect the effective number of candidates for president in each state to be a more important predictor of electoral dominance scores than the effective number of party lists for deputy. This expectation is consistent with how electoral lists are formed by party bosses in state-based conventions and then how coalitions are negotiated subsequently (Samuels 2003). If presidential coattails effects are strong, subnational incumbents will gain the benefits of the “reductive effect” of these ties by running on the same ticket as the president or joining in a coalition with the president’s party. Consequently, the ENEL of presidential competition in each state ought to influence subnational electoral dominance much more strongly than the ENEL of elections for federal deputy.

Copartisanship is a related factor in that presidents should be able to discipline governors of their own party organization more than the parties of coalition partners or rivals (Giraudy 2010: 63). In Brazil, this prospect is less convincing given that most parties, and particularly those on the right and center-right that are most associated with subnational authoritarianism, are largely devoid of the internal bureaucratic structures that discipline copartisans. Nonetheless, since this factor figures prominently in the scholarship on subnational authoritarianism in countries such as Mexico and Argentina, it is tested here as well.

The statistical analysis in this study employs an original dataset of 26 Brazilian states organized by election year from 1990 to 2006. Since the 1994, 1998, 2002, and 2006 elections were concurrent, this selection allows for coattails effects. The 2006 contest, which was more competitive, is excluded from some specifications and then included to test the robustness of the initial findings. The ENELs of presidential and lower house races are calculated using the Laakso-Taagepera equation. Since district magnitude (M) can affect the effective number of electoral lists for federal deputy, and thereby indirectly affect electoral dominance scores, it is controlled in the models. Following Taagepera and Shugart (1989), the natural log of M is used in the models. Given great disparities in wealth and income across regions of Brazil, we should expect that levels of development will have an effect on the prevalence of conservative rule. This is consistent with much scholarship on clientelism (Hagopian 1996; Lewin 1987; Reis and Castro 1992) and uneven development (Schwartzman 1982) in Brazil. The models include controls for per capita GDP and population that are appropriate for testing the role of electoral competition as well as fiscal predictors. To test the rentier explanation, the models include federal transfers as a percentage of total public revenues per state.
The analysis employs panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) as the most efficient option for TSCS data. The PCSE technique is most efficient in the face of panel-level heteroskedasticity and serial autocorrelation. Though the underlying dataset is panel-dominant (N>T) as opposed to time-dominant, the disparity is not so great that PCSE may not be used (cf. Beck 2001). As a robustness check, a panel estimation technique controlling for election-year fixed effects is also employed though the coefficients for the years are unreported. This technique is recommended for data that is panel-dominant (Huber, Nielsen, Pribble, and Stephens 2006) and it is substantively justified given that specific national electoral dynamics such as the identity and partisan associations of competing candidates for president should affect all subnational contests.

[Table 2 Estimators of Electoral Dominance in the Brazilian States, 1990-2002]

Table 2 reports the results for the statistical analysis of electoral dominance in the Brazilian states. The results confirm Samuels’ (2000) insight that the opportunity structures of electoral competition in the states is independent of presidential coattails. Samuels finds that federal deputies turn to governors to secure their political careers. This study shows that such party-level and inter-party bargains struck at the subnational level determine the competitiveness of these regimes despite different forms and levels of intergovernmental influence over time. The base model (Model 1) demonstrates that only the endogenous competition term is a statistically significant predictor of electoral dominance when controlling for presidential ENEL. Richer areas have more competition, which is expected and largely consistent with the ranking of states in Table 1.

Models 2 and 3 test the influence of partisan effects, differentiating between the party of the winning gubernatorial candidate (Model 2) and the winning coalition (Model 3). The largest conservative party, the PFL, predicts electoral dominance most consistently in both specifications. The PMDB, the largest catch-all party, is significant in the coalitional model only. This is not surprising since it appears as a viable coalition partner for conservatives in most cases, and as indicated above, particularly in the traditional cases of the Northeastern states. Notably, the PSDB and the PT, the two parties of the presidents who served after 1994, are not significant, undermining the proposition that presidential copartisanship affects the competitiveness of subnational regimes in Brazil. Model 4 confirms Ames’ (2001) finding that the Northeast region is uniquely a place of high political dominance, though the finding is not consistent given the insignificance of the regional dummy in the fixed-effects model.

The results presented in Table 2 suggest that the dynamics of electoral dominance across the Brazilian states and over time are determined by factors endogenous to the influence of subnational politics. First, the influence of governors in shaping political opportunity structures is notable. Using Model 2, a one standard deviation increase above the mean for the ENEL for federal deputy produces a shift in electoral dominance akin to moving Maranhão four ranks down on Table 1 to the position held by Mato Grosso. A similar reduction in the ENEL for deputies can move the southern state of Paraná with little history of political machines (Ames
2001: 110-116) to the position held by Alagoas, one of the most machine-dominated states in the Northeast. Second, conservative incumbents retain substantial influence over the least competitive subnational regimes. States in which the winning gubernatorial candidate runs on the PFL ticket have mean electoral dominance scores of .429 (somewhere between Goiás and Pernambuco on Table 1). When the winner is associated with any other party, the mean score is -.146 (somewhere between Paraná and Santa Catarina on Table 1). A proportional swing occurs when the PFL is part of a winning coalition. Finally, the cohort of states in the Northeast, with some exceptions (e.g., Piauí), tend to harbor the least competitive subnational regimes. Based on Model 4, the placement of a state in the Northeast region increases its rank on Table 1 an average of 6.2 places. Though, once again, some caution with this finding is warranted since it is the least robust endogenous predictor.

These statistical findings cast doubt on intergovernmental pressure as a force shaping electoral dominance in the states. Consistent with much work on the influence of governors in Brazilian politics (Samuels 2003; Abrúcio 1998), this study finds that more attention to factors endogenous to state politics is a more fruitful approach to understanding the dynamics of these political systems. In the next section, I turn to a paired-comparison employing spatial and qualitative analysis to illustrate how territory as a factor can explain the dynamics of electoral dominance.

The Spatial Analysis

Space is an important determinant of electoral dominance, particularly in the states of the Northeast. As indicated above, conservatives in these states enjoy a floor of support in poor, rural areas in which clientele networks dominate political activity. Urban areas in these states are more competitive as even leftists are able to organize in opposition, but they find it difficult to sustain this mobilization in the bailiwicks of conservatives. The “fight for space” in these states is an exercise in trading spaces; some are contiguous and contested, while others are more far-flung and remain dominated by one or the other political force.

The following paired comparison of the spatial distribution of support for gubernatorial candidates in 2006 in the states of Bahia and Maranhão serves to illustrate how this process affects the capacity of conservatives to retain their electoral dominance. The selection of these cases tests exogenous factors as well. Lula was heavily involved in both of these contests but with decidedly different strategic interests. In Bahia, Lula strongly supported Jacques Wagner of the PT. Wagner was closely tied to the president, having served him as an advisor in the Planalto during the difficult months of the corruption scandals of 2005. Wagner was also connected to Lula’s social agenda, giving him the benefit of sharing in the credit-claiming regarding Bolsa Família that scholars associate with strong support for Lula. Thus advantaged, the challenger was lifted to victory against a spent conservative machine led by Paulo Souto, a former governor and one of ACM’s closest protégés. Nevertheless, spatial evidence on this case will show that neither Lula’s coattails nor the BF cut into conservatives’ bailiwicks. Wagner’s victory was due to the
organizational abilities of his supporting alliance of leftist parties to mobilize and expand the urban vote.

In Maranhão, the incumbent machine led by former governor, Roseana Sarney, had the benefit of Lula’s support due to the president’s dependence on federal Senate President José Sarney’s advocacy of the Planalto’s legislative agenda. Despite these ties, however, the opposition candidate, Jackson Lago (PDT), in alliance with the PT, won the governorship. Yet Lago failed to either galvanize the left in urban areas or break into the incumbent machine’s bailiwicks in the interior (especially in the southeastern part of the state). BF played little role as well. Working from this weakened position, Lago’s governorship eventually succumbed to court challenges made by the sarneyistas to return Roseana Sarney to power not two and a half years into his term of office.

Bahia

The conservative machine led by Antônio Carlos Magalhães (ACM) continued to dominate Bahian politics during the New Republic as it had since the carlistas first came to power in the state with military support during the late 1960s (Dantas Neto 2006). In the democratic period, the machine organized primarily through the PFL, the party of former governor and incumbent candidate for the governorship in 2006, Paulo Souto. Lula’s victory in 2002 and ACM’s previous estrangement from Cardoso during the second half of the president’s mandate complicated Souto’s re-election since the carlistas no longer retained privileged access to federal coffers. At the same time, Bahia’s importance in federal legislative politics remained a strong incentive for the PT to wrest control of the governorship. As a trusted lulista associated with the popular BF program, Wagner’s candidacy had strong national-level support.

Wagner’s base relied primarily on urban mobilization of the vote, as Figure 1 demonstrates by mapping the spatial bivariate relationship between vote shares and urbanization. This and all subsequent maps employ Local Indicators of Spatial Association (LISA). LISA calculates the cross-product of the standardized value of the first variable at a municipal location i with that of the average for another variable in contiguous neighbors. The shaded clusters are coded positive (“High-High”/“Low-Low”) and negative (“High-Low”/“Low-High”) and they show localized correlations that are statistically different from spatial randomness. Unshaded districts are not distinguishable statistically. Where values are inverse (high-low and low-high), clusters are designated as spatial outliers that are the converse of the linear relationship. Furthermore, the Moran’s I is given for the entire state. This coefficient is a measure of spatial autocorrelation that ranges from -1 (complete dispersion) to 1 (complete clustering). Positive Moran’s indices for the entire study area indicate an overall spatial clustering while negative coefficients indicate overall dispersion. Both overall and local results are discussed below.

[Figures 1-3 here]
Based on Figure 1, it is clear that conservatives and their leftist opponents in Bahia mobilize their support as we would expect in areas of the state that should favor their distinct organizational strategies. Wagner failed to penetrate the interior of the state where conservatives retained dominance over poor municipalities (grotões). Drawing from the Moran’s I coefficients, the opposition’s support clusters spatially while the right is more dispersed as we would expect from a dependence on a decentralized and localized system of clientele networks. Furthermore, neither Lula’s coattails nor Bolsa Família coverage played a role in shifting support to the opposition in these areas. Figure 2 shows a concentration of Lula’s support in the very urban centers that supported Wagner. This might suggest a coattails effect, but it just as easily serves to illustrate how important the urban mobilization pattern is for leftist parties and for both subnational and national candidates. Also, the positive effects of Lula’s presence on the ticket does not confirm the exogenous impact of his policies. Figure 3 demonstrates not only a dispersion of BF coverage with Wagner’s share of the vote but a clustering of BF coverage and support for conservatives. Despite Wagner’s personal connections to Lula and to BF, Souto was able to gain concentrations of support in the grotões enjoying high levels of social disbursements from the federal government. This demonstrates that credit-claiming from a popular social policy does not uniquely favor leftist oppositions. Conservatives can hijack these messages in their campaigns and retain dominance over poor, interior districts.

Maranhão

As in Bahia, a single political group dominated Maranhão politics from the 1960s until 2006. José Sarney was elected governor in 1966 and, later as first president of the New Republic, he consolidated and extended the pervasive dominance of his political machine by enabling his own daughter, Roseana Sarney, to claim the governorship twice, in 1994 and 1998. Having split from the faction led by José Tavares, the incumbent in 2002, Sarney mobilized the sarneyista machine in an attempt to return a third time to the governorship in 2006. Her opposition, led by the long-time mayor of the capital city of São Luís, Jackson Lago, was less unified than the coalition organized around Wagner. First, Lago and his party, the PDT, were not viewed by other leftists as offering a programmatic alternative to the sarneyistas.¹⁶ As the most recognizable anti-Sarney figure, Lago was acceptable but his candidacy had little to inspire the mobilization of a leftist opposition. Second, the PT maranhense was itself split between Lula’s own faction, Articulação, which supported the president’s stratagem of allying with the sarneyistas and the larger “authentic” opposition to the Sarneys known as the PT de Aço (PT of Steel). The PT de Aço was more organized and mobilized at the municipal level, but it lacked the capacity by itself to forge extra-partisan alliances that might have provided a stronger foundation to Lago’s candidacy.

Unlike Wagner, Lago was not able to concentrate support in an urban core, nor was he able to cut significantly into the interior bailiwicks of the sarneyistas. This left him and his allied partisans exposed to the efforts of the political machine to claw back power in the courts. Figure 4 shows that Lago’s support was demographically more dispersed than was the case for Roseana
Sarney. The results for the right do not confirm that Sarney received the support of the largest cities since her high-high clusters are located farthest from the capital of São Luís. Rather, the larger populations of the interior towns of the southeastern part of the state are systematically integrated into the clientele network of a machine that has been organizing the vote in these areas since the mid-1960s. One indication of this is that, while Lula’s share of the vote tends not to cluster with Sarney’s (Moran’s I= -0.12, \(p<.001\)) despite their political marriage of convenience (see Figure 5), the high-high clusters reside in the southeast, suggesting a machine effect in favor of the president and Sarney.

[Figure 4-6 here]

Regarding the left, Lago’s support clusters with Lula’s despite the president’s betrayal of his own party’s alliance with the PDT. Once again, Lula’s presence helps down-ticket leftists, but it is not due to either the president’s explicit campaign strategy of supporting Sarney or his social policies. As Figure 6 demonstrates, BF coverage clusters in some local areas with Lago’s vote shares, but it tends overall to disperse on the left (Moran’s I= -0.06, \(p<.001\)). As in Bahia, LISA analysis of BF for conservatives shows that it clusters in their bailiwicks, in this case in the southeast where the machine is strongest.

Conclusions

Brazil clearly differs from other countries with hybrid subnational regimes in that exogenous, inter-governmental factors appear to be weak predictors of the continuity or dynamics of electoral domination. While it shares the disparity across states of relative dependency on fiscal transfers that Argentina retains, the data provide little support for the rentier explanation. The study’s findings regarding the insignificance of copartisanship confirms what studies of Argentina and Mexico have shown to be the unnecessary role of parties as mechanisms for disciplining lower-level copartisans in subnational authoritarian regimes (e.g., Giraudy 2010: 75). But the insignificance of presidential lists is more telling as it suggests that electoral incentives for subnational incumbents to make deals with Brazilian presidents or aspirants are weaker than in these other cases. If anything, the history of the role of Brazil’s governors in the democratic period (and even during the bureaucratic-authoritarian period that preceded it) is that influence moves from the subnational to the national (Abrúcio 1998; Samuels 2003; Hagopian 1996). This essential difference with other democratic countries with hybrid subnational regimes is most useful in explaining the distinct dynamics governing electoral dominance in the Brazilian states.

The results suggest that factors endogenous to state politics may be more proximate and accurate predictors of electoral dominance across cases and over time. Given that electoral dominance in Brazil is highest among the poor states of the Northeast in which incumbent machines are led by the right and, at least recently, opposition has emerged on the left, attention to these factors is essential for developing our understanding of how dominance changes. Using
space as a factor in explaining the dynamics of electoral dominance, this study demonstrates that analytical attention to localization strategies of political candidates and parties is a fruitful pathway for further study. Both the Bahian and Maranhão cases show that conservative political machines and their leftist opponents retain distinct strategic advantages accruing from their locational dominance within state territories. Wagner’s success in Bahia in the 2006 contest was more a result of maintaining a core of support in urban and contiguous areas than it was the collateral benefit of the president’s social policies. The spatial analysis also reveals that the carlistas retain a floor of support in the grotões that has not been usurped by increased competitiveness of the regime. Lago’s ill-fated victory in 2006 in Maranhão is further evidence for the explanatory power of endogenous factors as the relatively weaker mobilizational base of leftists there and the continued dominance of the sarneyista machine, especially in the southeastern interior of the state, allowed the conservatives a base from which they could claw back the governorship.

The analysis in this study confirms much of what the extant scholarship on subnational authoritarianism considers the largely heterogeneous nature of these hybrid regimes. Giraudy (2010: 77) concludes similarly that not one exogenous nor endogenous explanation seems to satisfy the full range of observed dynamics in the cases. For example, scholars have only scratched the surface in studying the relevant exogenous factors, given that measurements for intergovernmental linkages are potentially broader than the few that have been operationalized thus far (Gibson 2005: 111-112). To be sure, the Brazilian case does not require that scholars dispense with territory-as-arena approaches to subnational authoritarianism, but without considering endogenous dynamics, such an approach by itself produces considerable omitted variable bias. This bias may vary across countries based on historical-institutional differences in multi-level and federal democracies (Fenwick 2010). Continued theory-building regarding subnational authoritarianism will require attention to these analytical dimensions.
Table 1: Electoral Dominance and Its Components by State and Region, 1990-2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Electoral Dominance</th>
<th>Gubernatorial Winner Vote Share</th>
<th>Succession Control</th>
<th>Winning Party Seat Share</th>
<th>Winning Coalition Seat Share</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ceará</td>
<td>NE</td>
<td>1.250</td>
<td>0.635</td>
<td>55.53</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>41.33</td>
<td>52.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tocantins</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>1.200</td>
<td>0.676</td>
<td>57.53</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>46.48</td>
<td>60.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahia</td>
<td>NE</td>
<td>1.040</td>
<td>0.574</td>
<td>55.90</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>32.15</td>
<td>53.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraíba</td>
<td>NE</td>
<td>0.926</td>
<td>1.524</td>
<td>53.68</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>38.20</td>
<td>51.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amazonas</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>0.801</td>
<td>0.761</td>
<td>55.85</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>16.70</td>
<td>59.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maranhão</td>
<td>NE</td>
<td>0.604</td>
<td>0.597</td>
<td>49.90</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>28.55</td>
<td>60.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pernambuco</td>
<td>NE</td>
<td>0.547</td>
<td>0.347</td>
<td>57.40</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>24.45</td>
<td>44.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goiás</td>
<td>CW</td>
<td>0.392</td>
<td>0.771</td>
<td>49.68</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>27.43</td>
<td>39.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mato Grosso</td>
<td>CW</td>
<td>0.343</td>
<td>0.975</td>
<td>60.70</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>24.98</td>
<td>41.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergipe</td>
<td>NE</td>
<td>0.207</td>
<td>1.238</td>
<td>51.28</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13.55</td>
<td>54.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alagoas</td>
<td>NE</td>
<td>0.186</td>
<td>0.715</td>
<td>63.30</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>16.65</td>
<td>31.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acre</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>0.059</td>
<td>0.527</td>
<td>49.18</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>23.95</td>
<td>37.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rio Grande do Norte</td>
<td>NE</td>
<td>-0.059</td>
<td>1.174</td>
<td>47.15</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>21.85</td>
<td>37.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roraima</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>-0.103</td>
<td>0.690</td>
<td>46.00</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>21.93</td>
<td>40.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraná</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>-0.129</td>
<td>0.887</td>
<td>41.88</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>21.40</td>
<td>37.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Catarina</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>-0.238</td>
<td>1.119</td>
<td>43.35</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>21.25</td>
<td>38.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mato Grosso do Sul</td>
<td>CW</td>
<td>-0.340</td>
<td>0.866</td>
<td>48.55</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16.68</td>
<td>30.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rio de Janeiro</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>-0.405</td>
<td>0.891</td>
<td>49.10</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>17.85</td>
<td>28.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pará</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>-0.423</td>
<td>0.838</td>
<td>40.03</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>16.48</td>
<td>33.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piauí</td>
<td>NE</td>
<td>-0.467</td>
<td>0.896</td>
<td>44.75</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>24.18</td>
<td>30.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>São Paulo</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>-0.608</td>
<td>0.070</td>
<td>34.08</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>20.53</td>
<td>27.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amapá</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>-0.696</td>
<td>0.664</td>
<td>42.33</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>13.98</td>
<td>29.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rio Grande do Sul</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>-0.814</td>
<td>0.263</td>
<td>43.10</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>20.00</td>
<td>23.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Espírito Santo</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>-0.874</td>
<td>0.537</td>
<td>51.43</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10.83</td>
<td>22.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minas Gerais</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>-0.954</td>
<td>0.308</td>
<td>43.30</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>11.05</td>
<td>25.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rondônia</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>-1.663</td>
<td>0.570</td>
<td>32.93</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10.43</td>
<td>14.58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2: Estimators of Electoral Dominance in the Brazilian States, 1990-2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Base Model</th>
<th>Winning Parties</th>
<th>Winning Coalitions</th>
<th>Regions</th>
<th>Fixed-Effects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy ENEL</td>
<td>-.200</td>
<td>-.180</td>
<td>-.159</td>
<td>-.189</td>
<td>-.138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.055)***</td>
<td>(.070)**</td>
<td>(.057)**</td>
<td>(.072)**</td>
<td>(.067)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential ENEL</td>
<td>-.046</td>
<td>-.123</td>
<td>-.074</td>
<td>-.130</td>
<td>-.146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.076)</td>
<td>(.095)</td>
<td>(.116)</td>
<td>(.100)</td>
<td>(.123)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M logged</td>
<td>-.060</td>
<td>-.134</td>
<td>.134</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>.092</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.540)</td>
<td>(.396)</td>
<td>(.328)</td>
<td>(.161)</td>
<td>(.211)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiscal transfers</td>
<td>-.172</td>
<td>-.099</td>
<td>-.645</td>
<td>-.392</td>
<td>-.124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.333)</td>
<td>(.875)</td>
<td>(1.089)</td>
<td>(.752)</td>
<td>(.951)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>-.258**</td>
<td>-.192**</td>
<td>-.275**</td>
<td>-.063</td>
<td>(.194)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.092)**</td>
<td>(.090)**</td>
<td>(.093)**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population logged</td>
<td>.239</td>
<td>.236</td>
<td>-.003</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.305)</td>
<td>(.256)</td>
<td>(.255)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMDB</td>
<td>.187</td>
<td>.320**</td>
<td>.156</td>
<td>.283</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.354)</td>
<td>(.144)**</td>
<td>(.323)</td>
<td>(.296)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFL</td>
<td>.575**</td>
<td>.638**</td>
<td>.598**</td>
<td>.617**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.234)**</td>
<td>(.129)**</td>
<td>(.239)**</td>
<td>(.236)**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSDB</td>
<td>-.023</td>
<td>.131</td>
<td>.117</td>
<td>.073</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.307)</td>
<td>(.233)</td>
<td>(.215)</td>
<td>(.220)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT</td>
<td>-.424</td>
<td>-.041</td>
<td>-.370</td>
<td>-.248</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.437)</td>
<td>(.323)</td>
<td>(.390)</td>
<td>(.378)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.575</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.382</td>
<td>(.103)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.048</td>
<td>.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.173)</td>
<td>(.639)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.159</td>
<td>-.224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.270)</td>
<td>(.338)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-.1360</td>
<td>-.1332</td>
<td>1.381</td>
<td>1.290</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.253)</td>
<td>(2.896)</td>
<td>(3.071)</td>
<td>(.758)*</td>
<td>(.731)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-square</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>.33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figures are unstandardized regression coefficients with panel-corrected standard errors for models 1-4 and robust standard errors for model 5 in parentheses. Coefficients in bold are statistically significant: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.001.
Figure 1: Political Support and Urbanization, Bahia 2006
Figure 2: Support for Lula and Gubernatorial Vote Shares, Bahia 2006
Figure 3: Political Support and *Bolsa Família* Coverage, Bahia 2006
Figure 4: Political Support and Urbanization, Maranhão 2006
Figure 5: Support for Lula and Gubernatorial Vote Shares, Maranhão 2006
Figure 6: Political Support and *Bolsa Família* Coverage, Maranhão 2006
Works Cited


Notes

1 Given generally weak parties and high personalism in Brazilian elections, it was easier to code the 3’s than the 1’s and the 2’s. These were done “by hand” through a comparison of party labels in winning and rival coalitions, candidate profiles, and ideological profile of parties at the time of the election.

2 Notably, inclusion of the 2006 contest only moves two states listed in the top 12 a couple of ranks, but it does not greatly alter the results presented here.

3 The term is Borges’, who conducts a factor analysis that produces a state ranking not very different from my own.

4 Although re-election for governor was not legalized until 1998, several governors returned for nonconsecutive second or more terms during the pre-98 period.

5 On the weakness of parties and the party system in Brazil, see Mainwaring (1999).

6 For a similar study that uses subnational comparisons and the more conventional measure of natural resource dependency, see Goldberg et al. (2008).

7 Domination (D_i) = V_i, where i is the candidate’s share of all votes cast per municipality x and then weighted by T_{ix} (percentage of the candidate’s total vote municipality x contributes). Notably, Ames (2001: 74, 100-101) finds that domination is more clustered in the Northeast than in other regions.

8 One could also use ENEL for governor, but the electoral dominance score is partly endogenous to it.

9 The federal district of Brasília is excluded due to its extreme values on socio-economic controls and its small population and size relative to the other states.

10 This formula is represented as N = 1/\sum x_i^2, where x_i is the percentage of seats held by the i-th party. Following this formula, if the distribution of seats favors two parties in similar proportions, with a third minor party taking the remainder of seats, N will be some number between 2.0 and 3.0.

11 Wooldridge tests on all specifications confirmed the absence of serial AR(1) autocorrelation, obviating the need for a correction such as the use of Prais-Winsten estimators with PCSE.

12 To account for panel-level heteroskedasticity, a robust-cluster estimator was used in these specifications.

13 These results hold when the 1990 contest is dropped.

14 Author interview with special adviser to Governor Wagner, Jones Carvalho, Ouvidor Geral do Estado, Salvador, June 18, 2009.

15 Given p-values are tested against 999 permutations for spatial randomness.

16 Author interviews with the presidents of PCdoB, PPS, and PMDB. I thank Arleth Borges and Wagner Cabral for their insights on this point.