

Coming To the Table: How the Masses Lead RSMOs and the State to Negotiation

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David Zumba

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Abstract: This paper explores the influences on the decisions made by radical social movement organizations (RSMOs) and the state that leads to an unlikely group that opposes the state through armed dissidents becoming institutionalized as a political party or the continue of a protracted conflict. Resource mobilization's "professional organizer" model would explain the decisions that lead to negotiation as dependent on the decisions and preferences of the elites in an organization, which I contest by proposing that the benefits and cost of institutionalization are dependent on the only necessary resource that holds both RSMOs and the state accountable, the internal masses of an organization and the external masses of the state.

Coming To The Table: How The Masses Lead RSMOs and The State To Negotiation

The Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) movement was a radical left wing organization that waged a guerilla war against the state of Guatemala. As time passed, this violent organization reached an agreement with the state to lay down their arms and join the state as a political party, becoming institutionalized. On the other hand, the communist guerilla movement Sendero Luminoso in Peru was not approached by the state and has remained fighting a protracted war against the state despite the capture of its leaders. RSMOs commit to violence against the state in the hope to gain political power, the overall goal of all RSMOs, but this motivation for violence has various outcomes that lead these groups to become institutionalized, co-opted, or maintain the status quo of a protracted war. The divergence of these outcomes stems from the internal and external dynamics of both the state and RSMOs. The impact of these dimensions influences the decision of both groups to participate in negotiations or to not participate. Getting a better understanding of what influences these dynamics that determine the decision to negotiate for both the state and RSMOs gives a greater comprehension on what causes these divergences in outcomes to occur.

In this paper I will argue that the superior theoretical frame is Doug McAdam's political process model that incorporates both internal and external dynamics of RSMOs and the state sufficiently explaining the decision to negotiate. The political process model asserts that decisions and actions made by a group, RSMOs or the state, is determined primarily by the masses of that group and also by the presence of political opportunity. This theory addresses many aspects of RSMOs and state relations, which is why I will argue in this paper that it is the

best theory to explain the move towards negotiation. Other theories such as resource deprivation, radical flank effect, and the political organizer model fail to properly address major considerations in the decision making and the action taking for both, RSMOs and the state.

Representation and power is at the core of both the state and RSMOs and for these groups' representation and power are affected by their decision to negotiate or not with one another. The power of the state tends to be one that is responsive to the nation's social and economic climate for its constituents, primarily privileged groups. The state formulates policies as a controlling group, tending to specific issues and needs of its constituents. RSMOs oppose the state on the basis of exclusion and they fight for goals based on the principles of representation and political power particularly for marginalized and destitute communities. RSMOs carry out violence towards political leaders, state representatives, the community elites, and sometimes even peasants causing a variation in support relations with these groups. The power and representation of both groups leads RSMOs actions the ability to promote changes in policy, but also allows the state the ability to initiate policy reform that provokes social protest (Sawyers and Meyer, 1999, 189).

The goal of this paper is to pinpoint what influences the state and RSMOs to weigh the costs and benefits in the decision to negotiate with each other. Some questions that I will be considering to explore for this paper are: At what point do movements recognize that more is gained from non-violent participation than from continuing an armed struggle? What triggers this calculation? What makes an RSMO decide to abandon negotiation and return back to an armed struggle? What and why is it that some RSMOs are engaged in this process of institutionalizing and others are not? Is the decision to negotiate made internally or externally? What incentives are there for a state to negotiate with an RSMO? Does negotiating with the state

make RSMOs internally weaker? What roles do the social and political elites play in the decision to negotiate? These are some of the questions that this paper will address

This paper is comprised of 5 sections: my literature review, research design, two case studies, results, and a conclusion. My literature review will outline current theories and literature related to my topic. It is here where I will outline important features of RSMOs and examine current theoretical debates. My research design reviews my reasons for case selection, how I intend on testing my hypothesis, and defining key terms such as radical social movement organizations. Next there are two case studies of: the URNG in Guatemala and Sendero Luminoso in Peru. In my case studies I will give an overview of these movements and review the events between the RSMO and the state, the results of these events, and the purpose of how this outcome came to be. Finally in the conclusion, I will discuss the various aspects of the cases that either support or deny my hypothesis on what causes RSMOs and the state to go to the negotiation table.

Literature Review

There are many factors that need to be taken into consideration when trying to understand and explore what influences the decision for the state and RSMOs to negotiate. There are four major theories that I am going to be exploring in this section of the paper: Crosby's resource deprivation theory, Herbert Haines's radical flank effect, resource mobilizations diverging theories the "professional organizer" by McCarthy and Zald and Doug McAdam's "political process" theory. These theories were selected because of their ability to be broken down in to an economic perspective of a cost benefit analyses. In addition, these theories are dominate theories in the field of social movements that have spawned other theories and various empirical analyses.

I argue that McAdam's political process model is a better explanation opposed to the other theories that are examined because it is the only theory that considers the strength of mass support internally and externally on the decision and actions of both the state and RSMOs. It is these consideration of factors that makes the political process theory best suited to answer the question at hand. It incorporates some of the other theories, but also differs in the sense that it takes multiple perspectives and combines them. Ultimately, what is different and what makes McAdam's theory best is the consideration of timing and the importance of political opportunity that it has instilled in its model.

Relative Deprivation Theory

It is important to examine the internal dynamics of an organization because of the integral role that members and leaders play in maintaining and sustaining organizations. The importance of examining internal dynamics led me to Faye Crosby's relative deprivation theory. Relative deprivation theory is comprised of two components, the cognitive component and the emotional component. The cognitive component is based on the fundamental idea that it is not a person's objective situation that determines his or hers sense of satisfaction, but rather the person's relative status. In other words, a person or groups action is not based on their hopes and goals, but is based on their current situation. Deprivation is attached to this theory's name based on the idea that concern arises when people feel relatively poorly off, rather than in situations were they feel that there is a relative advantage (Crosby, 1979, 104). Deprivation delineates the choices and reasons for members and an organization to behave and act in a particular manner.

The emotional component is dependent on the intensity of emotion that measures people or a group's hostile feelings and the actions that they take. These emotions are primarily negative ones, such as anger, outrage or grievances. Crosby proposes that for negative emotions

to arise, four preconditions must be met: 1) A person or group must see that someone possesses X; 2) A person or group must want X; 3) A person or group must feel entitled to X; 4) A person or group must not blame themselves for not having X (Taylor and Moghaddam, 1994, 122).

Crosby's theory would explain that negotiation is dependent on the individuals' emotions for both the state and RSMOs. For RSMOs this theory helps explain their decision to negotiate based on the preconditions that consume their constituency. The public knows and understands the disparity that exists in the state and that a major cause of this is the lack of political power. To resolve this disparity these individuals and groups seek changes in the distribution of political power through representation. These marginalized people feel entitled to this power and representation because they are members within society. They view themselves as equals deserving representation and recognition, but they lack any social remedies that other groups and communities receive to combat issues. The cost in this sense for members of RSMOs and the group that is being represented, is a simple loss of autonomy and control of local governance but the benefits are that there is an existing platform of representation so that there is a possibility that group concerns might be addressed. Other benefits are that these communities can no longer be completely ignored by the state and that the focus of these communities can shift from battling the state to working on improving relations with the state to receive social benefits. This approach might help give insight on how internal dynamics explains decisions made by RSMO to negotiate, but this theory fails to properly recognize the influence of external factors and the theory is also limited in explaining decisions made by the state.

The limitations that makes relative deprivation a weak explanation for the decision to negotiate are that this theory does not take into account: the restrictions on the type of emotions being examined, whose emotions are focused on, and the influence of emotion on collective

action. Relative deprivation only takes into account emotions such as frustration, anger, and outrage, limiting the range and completely disregarding other emotions that might account for action. An example that Taylor and Moghaddam use from Folger's 1986 article entitled "A referent cognitions theory of relative deprivation" states that "in the context of his referent cognitions theory, points to emotions such as "hope" and "faith in the existing system" as important determinants of behavior..." (Taylor and Moghaddam, 1994, 133). These two emotions can be driving factors that causes a group to a particular decision that might be in favor of negotiating with the state due to this outlook. These emotions also have a great affect on the internal composition and decision making of a group.

Relative deprivation also fails at operationalizing behavior. Behavior is not clearly outlined as a specific action or persona, meaning that behavior could be operationalized as variables that may be negative attitudes toward violent tactics or the belief that violence is a legitimate means to gaining rights. The perspective of relative deprivation does not take into consideration at all the decision of the state as a group, the emotions and preconditions stated may be present within individuals of the state, but fails to account for political party actions and does not allow for the recognition of cost and benefits seen by the state. The failure to recognize these aspects causes this theory to be an unacceptable explanation to why RSMOs and the state decide to negotiate.

Herbert Haines's Radical Flank Effect

The second theory to take into consideration for internal dynamics is Herbet Haines's radical flank effect. In "Black Radicalization and the Funding of Civil Rights: 1957-1970," Haines examines the role of "radical" activists in shaping the responses, in the form of financial contributions, that "moderates" receive in the civil rights movement (Haines, 1984, 31).

In this article Haines develops a theory that states that:

“...radicals in a social movement can undermine the position of moderates by discrediting movement activities and goals, and by threatening the ability of moderates to take advantage of the resources available from supportive third parties. I refer to this general backlash as the negative radical flank effect.” (Haines, 1984, 32)

Haines goes on to state that conversely there is also a “positive radical flank effect” which occurs when the position of the moderates is increased or strengthened by the presence of more radical groups (Haines, 1984, 32). These concepts are the core of Haines’s study and are also one of the first theories to draw a direct correlation to the dynamics of radicals and moderates. Haines’ ideas follow a trend of theories, such as McAdam’s, where he argues that the amount of outside funding for a SMO depends heavily upon the relative acceptability of the organizations that are involved in the struggle (Haines, 1984, 41).

What Haines theory is stating is that moderates positions are dependent on the actions of radicals. This means that the decision to negotiate has to come when radical activity is high because it helps to increase the states interest in maintaining power and control without change and moderates interest in deciding to negotiate in the hope to achieve moderate goals without the cost of the whole movement’s position. These actions cause moderates and the state to turn against the radical section of an organization because of the position and actions of radicals have exceeded the threshold of acceptability, causing for the fear of the state to flee, closing the door on negotiation and on institutionalization (Haines, 1984, 32, 35).

The limitation of Haines’s model is that it only accounts for the effects that groups have on each other based on separate actions, it does not account for scenarios were radical organizations are supported, in one way or another, by a moderate organization. Haines does not discuss how this mixture of support affects the outcomes of the organizations and the dynamic it imposes on supporters. This model also doesn’t specify how these groups interactions with each other have an overall affect on the perceptions of these organizations and the support that is

given to them. This limitations need to be taken into consideration enable to account for the decisions made to negotiate for both the state and RSMOs.

Resource Mobilization: “Professional Organizer”

There are two principle differences within the study of resource mobilization, one of these variations is a model proposed by McCarthy and Zald entitled “professional organizer” (Pichardo, 1988, 97). The professional organizer model operates through the perspective of the movement organizer rather than the perspective of the potential individual participant. This shift focuses specifically on the problems and obstacles faced only by the movement organizer. This model states that the bulk of this leadership and resources is for the most part provided by external agents and groups, primarily from the elite and middle class (Pichardo p. 99). This assumption is justified by the position that the oppressed groups lack social and economic capital to actively organize or inspire social change, that they have almost no bargaining power with which to advance the groups collective interest.

The disproportion of power and capital that exists allows for the control over the political arena to be in the hands of a few elite groups. These powerful groups have the ability to exclude the powerless with little fear of reprisal because of the control of the social and political channels it has and the tactics they use to maintain benefits and representation for their constituents. This lack of fear is a direct cause of the political elite to not take into consideration marginalized communities, leaving these groups with no representation and no political power to put forward their issues. For a community to gain representation it must receive support from outside the community, allowing for once impotent groups to slowly gain social and political capital. This dynamic of control changes when an organization gains some kind of social and economic

strength causing the state to fear reprisals from its constituents. If enough groups advocate for these groups causes, the cost could be for the current regime to be threatened.

The professional organizer model of resource mobilization is summed up with two major points. The first point is that collective action is a rare option because of the lack of resources and the threat of repression. The second point is that it is the interjection of external resources that grants deprived groups the ability to mobilize, but this interjection causes the groups decisions and actions to be held by this elite authority.

The problem with the professional organizer model is that it places too much emphasize on internal actors and it does not evaluate the importance and impact of external factors and the dynamic between internal and external factors. If elite support is accepted by a group than it is up to the elite member or leader to make decisive decisions on action that the organization should take. This notion does not take into account the mass opinion within the group and outside of the group at all. I argue that it is these external and internal factors that need to be taken into consideration as a determining factor of the decision to negotiate. It is the internal opinion of a group that leads to an analysis of costs and benefits of actions and it is the influence of the public that helps to apply social pressure on the state, causing a fear of reprisal. The masses in this sense, the members of an organization and the members of a polity have the strength in the decision process because they are the ones that the groups are catering to.

Resource Mobilization: “Political Process”

The other proposed model of resource mobilization theory is McAdam’s political process model, which I argue is the superior theory that helps explain why RSMOs and the state decide to negotiate. What makes this model superior is the fact that it incorporates both internal and external factors to explain what leads to actions and decisions. Like the professional organizer

model, the political process model holds the perspective that lays on the fundamental assumption that wealth and power are concentrated in the hands of a few groups, causing the deprivation of most peoples influence over major decisions that affect their lives. Both models also share the perspective as rational attempts by groups that are excluded "...to mobilize sufficient political leverage to advance collective interests through noninstitutionalized means."(McAdam, 1982, 37).

The political process model diverges from the professional organizer model in regard to the capabilities of excluded groups and the extent of control over the political system by the elites of society. Professional organizer theorist put forward the perception that elites have limitless power in politico-economic matters, while excluded groups are virtually impotent in this sense. However, the political process model interprets power through a Marxist viewpoint. This viewpoint recognizes the power disparity between elites and excluded groups is substantial, but that the attainment to power by the masses is inevitable. This inevitability is explained by excluded group's potential from the structural power that their location in multiple politico-economic structures that are affordable to them (McAdam, 1982, 37).

McAdam's political process model differs again in the belief that communities are capable of organizing and maintaining themselves. It is the communities desire for social change that provides the motivation for creating and maintaining movement organizations. This motivation is key in the formulation and maintaining of groups, but due to the lack of discretionary resources of these oppressed communities, these groups and movements become dependent on being economically dependent on the dominant community. McCarthy and Zald's interpretation of this dependency would be that it is further proof of the necessity for external intervention, but McAdam would counter this claim by stating that it is necessary that there is

some type of internal organization so that the community is prepared for social movement activity.

McCarthy and Zald imply in their model that elite groups are motivated by social conscience that they are "...willing, even aggressive, sponsors of social insurgency,"(McAdam, 1982, 25). In contrast to this the political process model proposes that all social movements, regardless of their sponsor or elite leaders, pose a threat to existing institutional arrangements in society, which does not depend on the substantive goals of the movement. The threat from social movements stems from their implicit challenge to established structures of polity membership and their enthusiasm for avoiding institutionalized political channels. In these channels is where the greatest power of disparity is between the challengers and members because in these channels members are able to monitor and control any substantive threat to their interest. Maintaining member interest in this fashion is beneficial as well because it allows them to avoid using more costly control strategies, such as violence or some other form of repression, which might cause the question of legitimacy to their actions, causing the questioning of legitimacy of the state and regime (McAdam, 1982, 26).

Political environment plays an integral role for motivations of action by the state and RSMOs. The professional organizer model holds that the status of the political environment and a groups alignment in low regard because elites are willing to be sponsors of social movement activity, but the motivation to dominate and control causes the status of the political environment and its susceptibility to social insurgency as important (Pichardo, 1988, 106). The political process model that examines the internal organization of a group is much more significant than how the professional organizer model examines it and that the political environment needs to be taken into a broader view and not be simply based on the alignment of political groups. The

political process model also states that the promotion of insurgency is indirect through a reconstruction of existing power relations, or social processes.

Literature Conclusion

My literature review examines four major theories in the field of social movements: relative deprivation, radical flank effect, and two different models within resource mobilization, the professional organizer and the political process models. All these theories aim to explain the actions and decisions of individuals and groups, but differentiate in the variables that they believe constitutes their analysis on decisions. The theories explanations range from emotion to psychology, and from economics to elites, but there is one theory that I see fit to properly account for the question of negotiation and that is Doug McAdam's "political process" theory. It is this theory I find to be a superior explanation for the move toward negotiation because it accounts for the majority rather than the elite, the timing and opportunity of action, and it takes into consideration that rationality is not the best measurement of definitive decisions.

Research Design

In the field of social movements there are various debates on what theories best accounts for an explanation of one aspect or another and which theories fail to account for explaining movement actions. It is important to get a better understanding of the dynamics between the state and RSMOs because of how prevalent social illnesses still are and how protracted armed conflicts helps to maintain the status quo in many societies throughout the world. That is why to further pursue on challenging my hypothesis and examining possible alternatives, it is important to further explain some key terms that I will be using throughout this paper, followed by testing the hypotheses that I have explored and finally an explanation of how the cases were selected for this study.

The key terms that I will be defining are: radical social movement organizations (RSMOs), resources, institutionalization, and the state. I identify radical social movement organization or RSMOs as a group that is a multi-issue organization with egalitarian practices and emancipator goals. These organizations oppose structured state governments and utilize violence to obtain political power. These groups also tend to represent marginalized communities that are poor and lack representation (Fitzgerald and Rodgers, 2000, 574 and 578). When stating resources I am referring to various things such as: money, personal, leadership, equipment, food, or basically anything that can add or take away from an RSMO or the state position.

Institutionalization and the state are two words that are essential to understand. Institutionalization can vary in meaning, but when I state that an RSMO is or becomes institutionalized, I am referring to when an RSMO has achieved the status as a recognized political power, particularly as a political party, within the state. Institutionalization can also be reached with the creation of policy aimed at achieving goals set by the organization, programs in this same sense inspired by the organization, but not in spite of it (Seippel, 2001, 123-124). According to Max Weber, for an entity to be a state it must retain a monopoly of authority and have a legitimate use of violence in the enforcement of its orders (Montero, 2008). I would also add that the state is composed of the institutions and agencies of the central government, bureaucracy and associated organizations.

To test the alternative and my hypothesis I will be conducting case studies. I will be examining specifically two cases in the format that first I will give an overview of the organization and its goals and the actions of both the RSMOs and the state. Following this overview my next step will be to break down the decisions analysis of the organization and state

through the perspectives of each theory. I will try to explain best, how the RSMOs and the state analyzed their situations through cost and benefits in regard to the theoretical models. Then I will discuss the various explanations given by the four different models and assess how they explain the relative outcomes in the relations between RSMOs and the state. Doing this will allow me to pinpoint what the main contributing factor to decision making in the perspective of the theories and conclude the case study by stating which theory properly explains the decisions made in the scenario. Finally, I will explain the significance of the study.

When selecting cases to use for this study it is important not to select specific cases to fit the hypothesis you think are right and to select in a non-bias format as much as possible. This is why when considering the criteria for my cases I decided that I wanted to select cases from a pool of countries that share a similar history, a similar region, and were democratic nations. This criteria led me to focus in Latin America and more specifically the Andean region. This selection process led me to examine Guatemala and Peru. These countries are different, but they do share similar characteristics such as the role the U.S. has played in the development of these nations economies and policies.

Case Studies

The URNG of Guatemala

In January of 1982 the Guatemalan Patriotic Unity Committee announced the unification of the four politico-military organizations: the Guerilla Army of the Poor (EGP), the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR), the Organization of People in Arms (ORPA) and the Guatemalan Labor Party, National Leadership Nucleus (PGT). The basis of this unification is a strategic base for popular revolutionary war (URNG, 1982, 115). The URNG in their statement to the people of Guatemala stated that their reason and hope for unifying was because “it is a unity to defend

ourselves from exploitation, oppression, discrimination and brutal repression; that is the unity to our struggle under the banner of the Popular Revolutionary War to defeat our enemies, take power...”(URNG, 1982, 116). Leading up to this unification, the situation in Guatemala since 1954 was that of a democracy taken control over by the U.S., with left wing parties thrown out of the government, genocide, mass murders, death squads, torture, imprisonment and disappearances. In the early 1980’s the Guatemalan army had initiated a brutal “scorched earth” campaign that left 100,000 to 150,000 people dead or “disappeared” (Jonas, 2000, 11). Guatemala at the time of this unification was in a state of repression and exclusion put forward by the government that at the time was under control by a military junta.

The URNG was formulated as a reaction to the brutality of the government and its five point program was aimed at addressing these human rights violations and social ills of the country. The URNG’s five point program consists of:

- I. The revolution will eliminate once and for all the repression against our people and will guarantee to all citizens, the supreme rights of life and peace.
- II. The revolution will set down the foundations for resolving the basic needs of the greater majority of our people by eliminating the political domination of the repressive rich, both national and foreign, who rule Guatemala.
- III. The revolution will guarantee equality between Indians and ladinos, and will end cultural oppression and discrimination.
- IV. The revolution will guarantee the creation of a New Society, in which all patriotic, popular, and democratic sectors will be represented in the government.
- V. Based on the principle of self-determination, the revolution will guarantee a policy of nonalignment and international cooperation which poor countries need in order to develop in modern world.” (URNG, 1982, 120 and 121.)

This program outlines the goals of the URNG and what they hope to establish if they did succeed in overthrowing the government. These goals illustrate that the URNG recognized that the state was repressing and denying the people the right to have community issues addressed. The government ignored the needs to address the issues of the increasing social gap, the poor indigenous communities, and to give proper democratic representation of the people in the marginalized communities.

The URNG was composed of two types of organizations, organizations seen as more politically focused and the other more military focused, this combination caused the URNG to adopt guerilla insurgency as a way to achieve its end. The benefit of this was that it was used as a mobilization strategy that initially capitalized on violence. Political violence was essentially used to serve as a rallying point for mobilizing people to the opposition. This violence also encouraged reactionary terror from the state which further more pushed some to join the guerrilla movement. This membership wavered dependent on current actions by the insurgency or the state, after a certain critical point violence frightened members and potential members to disband their ideas of being in the revolutionary movement (May, 1999, 69 and 81).

In 1986 the government was returned back to civilian rule with elected officials, concurrently, the URNG acknowledged that its strategy based on military victory or overthrowing the state by taking power was going to be an unworkable feat, there was a move towards peace. In 1986 the URNG began to propose communication and possible negotiations for a political settlement to war and the state began to openly communicate with the URNG. The peace accords that were reached were a mixture of great achievements, but also serious limitations in a series of compromises between two radically opposing viewpoints.

The first agreement reached was the human rights accord signed in 1994. This accord was important because it created a mechanism to check the Guatemalan state by ending the systematic violation of human rights through U.N. verification. The second accord was reached in 1995, on Identity and Rights of Indigenous peoples. This accord redefined Guatemala as a multiethnic, multicultural, and multilingual nation. This agreement required reforms in the country's educational, judicial, and political systems; it also creates a new basis for a new entitlement of Guatemala's indigenous majority and establishes their right to make claims on the

state. There are more accords that were agreed upon including the 1996 accord on Socioeconomic and Agrarian issues. This accord addressed the problems of poverty and commits the government to combat poverty. The shift in goals of the state came with the institutionalization of the URNG. Not only did they establish a political party, but they had many of their goals realized and incorporated into state policy. The URNG became an RSMO that had been institutionalized.

Examining this case through the perspectives of the various theories reviewed before, it is possible to identify the best-suited theory for this case. The first theory relative deprivation would describe that the grievances of the people of Guatemala, the members of the state, and members of the organizations pressured both parties to decide to negotiate. The members of the organization would in rational terms of emotion be tired of maintaining their status as being marginalized and at the same time, fighting a continuous war costing them the little resources they have and their lives. The people in the organization would understand that their situation had only gotten worse and that negotiation would be only for the betterment of their relative status, this would be to the community's benefit. The overall benefit for both the organization and the state would be the conservation of resources. The state would finally be able to stabilize itself and stop dedicating time and resources against a protracted war. The issue with this theory is that it fails to recognize the external forces that allowed for negotiation to be possible, which was that of political opportunity. The opportunity for negotiation only came when the transition of a state run by a brutal military junta became a civilian run state.

Herbert Haines's radical flank effect theory fails to address this case because of the unification that existed between moderates and radicals. Most organizations have two different types of members, radical and moderates, but since they are within the same organization they

are lumped together and the more extreme end is recognized. The URNG on the other hand was composed of different organizations of both types allowing for a general support from both constituencies. In this sense, unification worked because it helped to broaden the URNG support on different levels, causing no flank effect of resources. Since there was no flank effect then this theory cannot properly explain the URNG's decision to negotiate.

The "professional organizer" model would explain the URNG's decision to negotiate by stating that the URNG became dependent on the central committee of the URNG to make decisions for the organization, placing the power of action and decision in the hands of elites. This board was composed of selected leaders to represent each organization and were elite in that sense, but it is unclear to the actual privilege that they shared if any. The bigger issue though is the fact that the URNG made the decision to negotiate because it was thought to be the best alternative to a continuance of war to maintain and achieve their stated goals. The elites in this case based their decision on the five point program that was established by the organization itself, members of this unification were all supporters and initiators in the proposed five point program of the URNG. This means that since the committee was led and pushed by this five point program than it was the members and the goals that were the driving factor in the push for negotiation.

McAdam's "political process" in comparison to the other alternative theories is the best explanation for the URNG and the state to pursue negotiation because it takes into consideration the internal and external masses and the political opportunity that allowed for the catalyst towards negotiation. I already stated above the important role that the internal mass played in the decision to negotiate, but what is also important is to understand the importance of external masses. The general public of Guatemala played a large role in this case in, that it was the group

that gave the URNG wide spread support which helped them gain more political power and also granted a legitimate challenge to the state. The people of Guatemala saw this war simply as a cost to society, where social funding was depleted to combat the insurgency in the state. The larger cost was also the thousands of lives that were lost because of the battle between the URNG and the state. It all came to the point where there were clearly to all parties involved no benefits to bloodshed, only costs. What was a further catalyst for the push by the people of Guatemala was the pressure on the state from the U.N. and also the political opportunity that was present.

McAdam's theory states that for actions and decisions to have an influence they must occur during a time that the state is going through a political process. It is the political processes that sparks political opportunity and what occurred in this case was that the government transitioned from being under a military junta to a civilian government that was elected. It is this transition that allowed for mass external and internal support for negotiation to occur because the perspective that the government was being run by the military focused leaders had changed. Both the state and URNG saw that to negotiate would benefit each other socially and economically, by helping the URNG's goals and the issues of marginalized communities to be addressed and for the state to regain stability and legitimacy within the perspective of the people.

Sendero Luminoso of Peru

In 1968 the Peruvian state fell under a military coup under the banner that was to be revolutionary that was neither communist nor capitalist, but Peruvian (Palmer, 1980, 99). The military government pushed forward many reform initiatives in the attempt to make substantial changes in the country's economic and social structure (Palmer, 1992, 2). Under this military regime, inflation grew, external debt rose dramatically, and many of the initiatives brought in by

the regime lacked wide spread support, most importantly the land reform proposals. Peru's poor economy and failing social initiatives allowed for the government to be returned to civilian rule, so the first public elections since the coup were held in 1980 (Taylor, 1998, 35).

Peru's Sendero Luminoso launched its armed struggle against the state of Peru during the regime transition in 1980 with a symbolic attack whereby Sendero burned ballot boxes for the election that was taking place (Taylor, 1998, 35). Sendero was formed to fight for an alternative to what it believed was a continuum of corruption by the Peruvian state and to "...destroy the old foreign – dominated political system in Peru, to take power, and to create a "nationalistic," "Indian," and "popular" democracy (Manwaring, 1995, 158)." The insurrection by Sendero was started by middle-class university intellectuals, not poor villagers. Dr. Abimael Guzman was the key charismatic leader that essentially started pushing Maoist ideology into student discussions. Dr. Guzman was the one who developed Sendero's tactical strategy and ideology that was consumed by Marxist-Maoist ideology. Before officially formulating Sendero, Dr. Guzman was a part of other left wing organizations, but was dissatisfied with the unwillingness of the leadership to take up an armed struggle against the Peruvian government, this in turn helped to spark Sendero, but also Sendero's skepticism of other left wing political organizations (Starn, 1995, 404).

Initially the state did not pursue to combat Sendero because they were viewed as a small group that were operating in an area that the state of Peru did not hold much interest in, the countryside. At this time Sendero began attacking representatives of the state, murdering the controlling elite, and blowing up economic assets of Peru. Sendero would attack police stations, kill politicians, and indiscriminately killed people in an effort to purify or cleanse the country

side as an objective to “batir el camo” (Taylor, 1998, 41). As time went on and attacks on the state became more prevalent, the state decided to pursue and contain Sendero Luminoso.

The state pursued a repressive campaign against Sendero, but this campaign primarily consisted of the arbitrary killing of peasants in rural areas despite the fact if they were members of Sendero or not. Similarly, Sendero maintained its campaign to cleanse the countryside to remove all the political authorities, landlords, other leftist movements and all opposition to their movement. Sendero deployed violence against peasants, trade union organizers, popularly elected officials and the general civilian population. A famous party slogan of Sendero’s is “Blood will not drown the revolution, but water it (Starn, 1995, 409).” It was the indiscriminant killings of the peasantry and other left wing organizations that had a major impact on how Sendero was perceived at home and abroad (Ron, 2001, 570).

Support for Sendero waivered constantly throughout its discourse because it was dependent on whom the actions it had taken were against. In the early years of Sendero much of the control that they asserted in the countryside was focused on social justice in the areas especially towards large landowners who had maintained the privileged position even after the military government’s initiative to break up large land ownership. Some policies that Sendero put forward in the areas that they controlled had garnered a measure of popular support because they placed sanctions directed at rustlers, petty criminals, wife beaters, and other anti-social elements. It was at the point where many peasants were happy to have Sendero guerrillas among them because they distributed justice that benefited communities socially. Another catalyst to public support was due to the acts by the state and more specifically the special police unit called the Sinchis. The Sinchis were supposed to gain the trust and sympathy from the population, but their brutal operations actually increased the capability of Sendero to recruit (Taylor, 1998, 42).

In the late 1980's and early 1990's the strategy of the state changed and so did the position of Peru's population.

Sendero helped with social ailments in countryside communities, but failed to help change its poor economic ailments. Some of Sendero's policies also met resistance because they tried to impose a simple economy of subsistence on the peasantry in the hope to encircle and starve the towns (Taylor, 1998, 42). The Peruvian state also began to support other left wing organizations that were more moderate than Sendero by supporting their proposed initiatives and giving them financial support as well. Peru's army also changed in its approach to Sendero by becoming more in touch with civilians and also helping to support the new upsurge in peasant militias by working with them to purge the Maoist guerillas out of their strongholds (Starn, 1995, 411). The final turning point for Sendero was in 1992 when leader Dr. Guzman was captured and imprisoned by the state. Since then the protracted war against Sendero has continued with Sendero going underground and only a few times taking action against the state, actions that have now been deemed by Peru and other nations as terrorist attacks.

Examining this case through the various theoretical perspectives would help identify which model is best in explaining the decision to negotiate. The perspective that relative deprivation would explain would be that even though Sendero was a hardcore brutal left wing organization its members still recognized the positions that they were in and that they would be open to viable options that were at least a tangible improvement to their current marginalized status. Following the theory of this model, if the option of negotiation was presented than the RSMO would have accepted it because it improves the members current status and also eliminates many of the costs that were inflicted onto this population. Sendero's constituents would have only benefited and eliminated their cost if negotiation was accepted. Although, this

case contradicts this because despite the possible improvements of the community's relative situation, the decision of the RSMO was to continue a protracted war and to not negotiate with the state.

Herbert Haines's radical flank effect plays a large role in this case in that the presence of Sendero was so powerful that it pushed other moderate SMOs on the left to become institutionalized. This flank effect would shift the appropriation of resources to these other SMOs, weakening Sendero. Support and resources would have been primarily allocated to the moderate organizations because of their ability to instill actual change and also because of the political power that had been obtained. This means that other organizations, such as Sendero, would have been left without the resource support, or even popular support because of the lack of success of immediate change to their communities of focus. Sendero did not lay down their arms despite the fact that it was weakened and the loss of resources should have pushed Sendero to negotiate because of the unified front that opposed it, but the members of Sendero did not lay down their arms and preferred to continue a protracted war despite its lack of resources.

The professional organizer model in this case would have been Dr. Guzman. He was an elite intellectual that provided a key resource to Sendero and was the one responsible for the development of Sendero's tactics. This model states that all the power is in the hand of Dr. Guzman and other elite leaders of Sendero, that they are the ones that decide on the actions and methods Sendero would put forward. This is true for the majority of Sendero's history, but the problem arose when Dr. Guzman and other Sendero leaders were imprisoned. In the mid 1990's these leaders of Sendero, the elite asked to begin the peace process and open up for negotiation. This request for talks did not occur though, mainly because of the masses within the organization and also the external masses of support were not there.

Members of Sendero did not want to give up their arms because they felt that they were at the point that there would be no benefit to them. The mass society were against them and hated them for all the years of repression and brutal slayings that occurred that seemed to be for no benefits. Sendero's mass realized that the best option for them was to maintain the status quo because there were no foreseeable benefits to negotiations with the state. The state at this point did not see any benefits to negotiating with Sendero because mass support was on the states side and extremely opposed to Sendero. What helped the state gain this support was the effort to reach out to the peasants and to help support other left wing organizations that were more moderate than Sendero. What further pushed the external mass towards the state was the fact that many of these left wing organizations had wide support, particularly in the countryside, so that once these organizations were institutionalized, their support went with them. It got to the point that President Fujimori used victories against Sendero to bolster his reelection campaign despite the fact that his regime papered over human rights violations (Starn, 1995, 411). The people of the movement and the people of Peru detested each other based on brutality of their actions and in principle causing for a continuance in a protracted conflict that has continued till this day. These reasons for why both Peru and Sendero did not negotiate is supported by McAdam's theory of political process because it takes into account the importance of both internal and external masses in the decision making process.

Conclusion

In conclusion, these two cases leads me to understand that although certain aspects of alternative theories are present in the decision to negotiate, they fail to fully explain the influence of internal and external mass opinion on the decision to negotiate for RSMOs and the state. McAdam's theory of "political process" accounts for the importance of both mass reasoning and

political opportunity, meaning that it successfully accounts for the decision to negotiate by both the RSMOs and the state. In the case of the URNG it was the masses that led to the realization that it is better to have tangible goals rather than ones that are farfetched. The power of mass opinion influenced the government of Guatemala to pursue negotiations. It was a similar case for Sendero in the sense that the internal mass of Sendero decided to continue their war against the state of Peru, not the groups elites. The external mass played a large role in that dependent on whom they gave support to measured the success of the group in Guatemala and for Sendero, in Peru the people decided to side with the government.

I think it is important to understand that it is more difficult for an RSMO to gain external support because of the immediacy of its benefits, when the state has a longer period of time. A democracy has the ability to dissatisfy its population, but also has the ability to change which occurs through elections. This means that the demands of benefits from the state are less than that of the demands on RSMOs. RSMOs goals and benefits need to be quick and high impact and the success of an RSMO are measured by the amounts of initiatives that are successfully installed within the community and the direct benefits people receive. It is this dynamic that causes the high demand on RSMOs and also the swing in support for RSMOs.

Overall, my hypothesis was correct in that McAdam's "political process" model is a superior explanation for why RSMOs and the state decide to negotiate. It is the large roles played by both internal and external masses, despite the poor situations they face, that determines what is best for a group. To improve my research I would like to examine two RSMOs within the same country around the same time to try to control for biases and differences amongst nations. If I had more time the cases that I would explore to further my study would have been the M-19 and the FARC in Colombia to help account for any biases or distortions. I think

another major step that I would take to further improve my analysis would be to examine more extensively theories on mass action because I feel that this additional exploration would only further improve my analysis as well as support my findings from this study.

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